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IMPASSE RESOLUTION IN PUBLIC SECTOR
COLLECTIVE BARGAINING-AN
EXAMINATION OF COMPULSORY
INTEREST ARBITRATION IN NEW YORK
ARViD ANDERSON*
ELEANOR SOVERN MACDONALD**
JOHN F. O'REILLY***
In the last ten years, many state and local governments have
enacted statutes requiring the use of compulsory binding interest
arbitration as the ultimate means for achieving labor agreements
between a public employer and certain categories of public employ-
ees. Such legislation developed largely as a result of the failure of
traditional impasse resolution methods to prevent work stoppages
by public employees following deadlocked contract negotiations.
State and local legislatures recognized a need to design a system
which would provide finality in public sector collective bargaining
while both protecting the public against harmful strikes by essential
government employees and preserving the collective bargaining
rights of these employees. The growth of statutorily mandated inter-
est arbitration may also be described as a process of accommodating
collective bargaining, historically a mechanism for establishing
wages, hours, and working conditions in private industry, for use in
setting the terms and conditions of public employment.
In the private sector, the union and the employer bargain over
wages, hours, and working conditions, subject to the provisions of
the National Labor Relations Act.' If agreement is reached and a
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1 29 U.S.C. §§ 151-169 (1970 & Supp. V 1975).
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contract is signed, labor peace has been achieved. If the parties are
unable to reach agreement, the union and the employer may resort
to their respective economic weapons of strike and lockout.2 Such
activity is not only permissible under the federal labor law, it is an
important part of the national labor policy under which unions and
employers may resolve their disagreements through tests of
strength.' Indeed, it is often the threat of a strike or lockout with
grave consequences for employer and employees, rather than the
reasoned arguments of the negotiators, that precipitates a settle-
ment at the eleventh hour of negotiations. Under federal law, inter-
ference with economically motivated work stoppages is confined to
emergency situations threatening the safety and welfare of the pub-
lic.4 Notably, even in these limited instances this jurisdiction is
exercised with restraint.'
In public employment, however, the traditional assumption has
been that strikes are intolerable and ought to be banned completely.
Long before the recognition of collective bargaining rights for state
and local government workers in New York, the Condon-Wadlin Act
prohibited public employee strikes and provided severe penalties for
violations of this proscription.' The Taylor Law,7 enacted in 1967,
continues the ban on government-worker strikes,8 but also recog-
nizes the right of public employees to "form, join and participate
in" employee organizations.9 It is the purpose of the legislation "to
2 With respect to vital national services such as the railroads, in which the potential
disruptive effect of a strike or lockout is great, various statutory provisions are interposed to
avoid work stoppages. See Norris-LaGuardia Act, 29 U.S.C. §§ 101-115 (1970) (issuance of
temporary restraining order); Labor Management Relations Act, 29 U.S.C. § 178 (1970)
(injunction on petition of Attorney General); Railway Labor Act, 45 U.S.C. § 152 (1970) (duty
to settle disputes); id. §§ 157-159 (controversy submitted to arbitration).
See Buffalo Forge Co. v. United Steelworkers, 428 U.S. 397 (1976).
See note 2 supra.
See, e.g., United Steelworkers v. United States, 361 U.S. 39, 41 (1959) (per curiam),
construing Labor Management Relations Act, 29 U.S.C. § 178 (1970).
6 Ch. 790, 2 (1958] N.Y. Laws 1680. The focus of this act was on punishment rather
than on procedures for resolving disputes.
2 N.Y. Civ. SERv. LAw §§ 200-214 (McKinney 1973 & Supp. 1977).
Id. § 210. At least seven states currently disagree with the New York view and grant
some or all of their public employees a limited right to strike. ALASKA STAT. § 23.40.200 (1972);
HAw. REv. STAT. ANN. § 89-12 (Supp. 1974); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 179.64(1), (7) (West Supp.
1977); MoNT. REv. CODEs ANN. § 59-1603 (Supp. 1975) (as construed in State v. Public
Employees Craft Council, 165 Mont. 349, 529 P.2d 785 (1974); PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 43, §
1101.2201 (Purdon Supp. 1977); OR. REv. STAT. § 243.726 (1975); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 21, §
1730 (Supp. 1976). Even in these states, however, resort to the strike as a test of strength
represents not the preferred method of dispute resolution, but rather a last resort when all
else has failed. See Coughlin & Rader, Right to Strike and Compulsory Arbitration: Panacea
or Placebo?, 58 MARQ. L. REv. 205, 214 (1975).
1 N.Y. Civ. SERv. LAW § 202 (McKinney 1973).
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promote harmonious and cooperative relationships between govern-
ment and its employees and to protect the public by assuring, at all
times, the orderly and uninterrupted operations and functions of
government.""
To effectuate these objectives, the Taylor Law requires collec-
tive bargaining between public employee organizations and state
and local governments.1 ' The Law also provides rather draconian
penalties for violations of the prohibition against strikes, including
the deduction of two days pay for each day of the strike, the imposi-
tion of a one year probationary period on each striking employee,
and the possible loss of dues checkoff privileges for the union.'2
Although these harsh sanctions may prevent some strikes, they can-
not prevent all strikes. 3 Thus, an alternative means must be found
to prevent recourse to the strike in those instances where the collec-
tive negotiations are deadlocked and the situation threatens to pro-
duce a further test of strength rather than a settlement. The proce-
dures for resolving bargaining impasses in New York State, often
called methods for reaching finality in contract disputes, are set
forth in both the Taylor Law and the New York City Collective
Bargaining Law (NYCCBL)."
One of these methods, binding interest arbitration, has gained
increasing popularity and has been adopted in varying degrees by
eighteen states 5 and the United States Postal Service.'" This trend,
10 Id. § 200.
" Id. § 203-204.
12 Id. § 210.
11 There were a total of 32 strikes in New York in 1975. [1975] N.Y. PuB. EMP. REL. BD.
ANN. REP., appearing in Public Employment Relations Board News No. 3, at 8 (Mar. 1975).
" NEW YORK, N.Y. ADMIN. CODE §§ 1173-1.0 to -13.0 (1975 & Supp. 1976).
15 ALAsKA STAT. § 23.40.200 (1972) (compulsory arbitration applicable to essential state
workers, including policemen, firefighters, correctional employees, and hospital employees);
CONN. GEN. STAT. §§ 7-472, -473c, -474 (1977) (municipal employees); IowA CODE ANN. § 22.20
(West Supp. 1976) (all public employees); LA. REv. STAT. ANN. § 23-890 (West Supp. 1976)
(municipal transit employees); ME. REv. STAT. tit. 26, § 965(4) (Supp. 1977) (municipal
employees and teachers) id. § 979-D(4) (1974) (state employees); Act of Nov. 26, 1973, ch.
1078, § 4, 1973 Mass. Acts 1135, reprinted in MAss. ANN. LAWs ch. 150E, § 9 app., at 320
(Michie/Law. Co-op 1976) (police and firefighters); MICH. CoMP. LAws ANN. §§ 423.231-.244
(Supp. 1976) (local police, firefighters, and emergency service personnel); MINN. STAT. ANN.
§ 179.69(3) (West Supp. 1976) (essential public employees); NEB. Rev. STAT. §§ 43-801 to
-838 (1974 & Cum. Supp. 1976) (government employees) (Court of Industrial Relations); NEv.
REv. STAT. § 288.200 (1975) (local government employees); N.Y. Crv. SEnv. LAw § 209(4)
(McKinney Supp. 1977) (local police and firefighters); OR. REv. STAT. §§ 243.742-.762 (1975)
(police, firefighters and guards at correctional facilities and mental hospitals); PA. STAT. ANN.
tit. 43, §§ 217.4-.7 (Purdon Supp. 1977) (police and firefighters); id. § 11611.805 (correctional
guards and court employees); R.I. GEN. LAws §§ 28.9.1-1 to .5-13 (1968 & Supp. 1976) (fire-
fighters, police, teachers, and municipal employees); id. § 36-11-9 (Supp. 1976) (state em-
1977]
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however, has not escaped criticism. Requiring the parties to submit
their bargaining impasses to a third party has been said to "chill"
collective bargaining negotiations because the parties to the dispute
may believe that they can gain more through arbitration than can
be achieved from a negotiated settlement. 7 Moreover, the parties
are purportedly more willing to go to impasse when the result will
be third-party intervention rather than the serious economic conse-
quences of a strike or lockout." It has also been argued that interest
arbitration is incompatible with basic principles of representative
government because the policymaking responsibilities of the execu-
tive and the legislature are delegated to an ad hoc body, elected by
and responsible to no one.19 Opponents of interest arbitration have
further contended that this method for achieving finality adds a
costly, time-consuming step to collective bargaining. According to
this argument, the parties' loss of control over the negotiations often
results in awards which are rendered without consideration of the
public employer's ability to pay and which provide greater wage
increases than those achieved through collective negotiations."
It is the purpose of this Article to examine these arguments in
the light of New York State's experimental experience with compul-
sory interest arbitration of police and firefighter bargaining dis-
putes,2' to compare the New York State experience with that of New
ployees); UTAH CODE ANN. §§ 34-20a-7 to -9 (Supp. 1975) (firefighters); WASH. REv. CODE §
41.56.450-.470 (1974) (uniformed personnel); Wis. STAT. ANN. § 111.77 (West 1974 & Supp.
1976) (police and firefighters); Wyo. STAT. § 27-269 (1967) (firefighters).
16 The Postal Reorganization Act of 1970 establishes a system combining provisions of
the National Labor Relations Act with a binding arbitration procedure to resolve impasses
and avoid strikes, which are prohibited. See 39 U.S.C. §§ 1207, 1209 (1970). Similarly, Exec.
Order No. 11,491, § 17, 34 Fed. Reg. 17,612 (1969), reprinted in 5 U.S.C. § 7301 app., at 398
(1970), which has apparently never been invoked, allows the use of arbitration to resolve
impasses involving contract negotiations with employees of the executive branch of the fed-
eral government. Although there were attempts to institute compulsory arbitration in se-
lected areas of public employment as early as 1947, the vast majority of such provisions have
been enacted since 1968. See McAvoy, Binding Arbitration of Contract Terms: A New Ap-
proach to the Resolution of Disputes in the Public Sector, 72 COLUM. L. REv. 1192, 1193 nn.9-
10 (1972).
,1 For a discussion of these arguments, see McAvoy, Binding Arbitration of Contract
Terms: A New Approach to the Resolution of Disputes in the Public Sector, 72 COLUM. L.
REV. 1192, 1209-10 (1972).
,1 P. FEUILLE, FINAL OFFER ARBITRATION: CONCEPTS, DEVELOPMENTS, TECHNIQUES 9-12
(Public Employee Relations Library No. 50, 1975).
" The delegation argument is discussed in Grodin, Political Aspects of Public Sector
Interest Arbitration, 1 INDUS. REL. L.J. 1 (1976).
20 Zagoria, Compulsory, Binding Arbitration Likely to be Pushed In 1977, L.R.M.S.
Newsletter 3 (Dec. 1976).
21 N.Y. Cry. SERv. LAW § 209(4) (McKinney Supp. 1977) sets forth the procedures to be
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York City and other jurisdictions that mandate interest arbitration,
and finally, to consider the future of interest arbitration in New
York State.22
TAYLOR LAW FINALT PROCEDURES OTHER THAN BINDING INTEREST
ARBITRATION
The Taylor Law currently provides two types of finality proce-
dures: 23 Public Employment Relations Board (PERB) assistance
and a mandatory legislative hearing for most public employees, 2
and PERB assistance and binding interest arbitration for police and
firefighters outside of New York City.2s Employees of school districts
and higher education facilities can obtain PERB assistance, but are
not provided with a finality procedure.2 1 Essentially, PERB assis-
tance 7 includes appointment of a mediator,2s subsequent designa-
followed in the event of an impasse in collective bargaining between a governmental subdivi-
sion and its police or fire department.
12 This Article will discuss the method of finality known as "interest arbitration," where-
in an arbitration award is issued that resolves the dispute of the parties relating to their
failure to agree on a contract. "Rights arbitration," which is a method for determining the
rights of a party under an executed contract, will not be discussed.
" Under the original version of the Taylor Law, ch. 392, 1 [1967] N.Y. Laws 1102, the
provision authorizing legislative hearings in the event of an impasse was applicable to all
public employees under the jurisdiction of the Public Employment Relations Board. The
present version is more limited in scope. See N.Y. Cirv. SERv. LAw § 209(3)(e) (McKinney
Supp. 1977).
24 N.Y. CIv. SERV. LAw § 209(3) (McKinney Supp. 1977).
" Id. § 209(4).
26 See id. § 209(3)(f).
= If the parties to collective negotiations fail to reach agreement "at least one hundred
twenty days prior to the end of the fiscal year of the public employer" an impasse may be
declared. Id. § 209(1). Unless the public employer and the public employee organization have
agreed to "procedures to be invoked in the event of disputes which reach an impasse in the
course of collective negotiations," id. § 209(2), PERB is empowered to render assistance to
the parties. The assistance to be given by PERB, either at the request of a party or on the
motion of PERB itself, consists of mandatory appointment of "a mediator or mediators
representative of the public from a list of qualified persons maintained by the board." Id. §
209(3)(a) (McKinney 1973). If the impasse is not resolved with the help of mediation, the
Board is required to "appoint a fact-finding board of not more than three members, each
representative of the public, from a list of qualified persons maintained by the board." Id. §
209(3)(b). This factfinding board has the power to "make public recommendations for the
resolution of the dispute," as well as certain unspecified powers "delegated to it by the
board." Id.
After appointment of the factfinding board, if the contract dispute is not resolved at least
80 days before the end of the employer's fiscal year or such other appropriate date set by
PEB, the factfinding board transmits its "findings of fact and recommendations for resolu-
tion of the dispute" to the chief executive of the employer. Within 5 days of such transmission
the report is to be made public, and the factfinding board is empowered to "assist the parties
to effect a voluntary resolution of the dispute." Id. § 209(3)(c).
n Id. § 209(3)(a).
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tion of a factfinding board," submission of PERB recommendations
based on the factfinding board's conclusions, and aid in implement-
ing voluntary arbitration.
If PERB assistance does not resolve the dispute, the final im-
passe procedures prescribed by the Taylor Law are invoked. In those
negotiations wherein a legislative hearing is the final impasse reso-
lution method, the chief executive officer of the government em-
ployer must submit a copy of the factfinding board's conclusions to
the legislative body along with his "recommendations for settling
the dispute" unless both sides accept the board's conclusions within
ten days after they are received by the chief executive." If the rec-
ommendations are not accepted, the legislative body of the public
employer must provide the employee group with an opportunity to
submit its proposed solution and conduct "forthwith . . . a public
hearing at which the parties shall be required to explain their posi-
tions with respect to the report of the factfinding board. '3 2 Follow-
ing the hearing, "the legislative body shall take such action as it
deems to be in the public interest, including the interest of the
public employees involved. '"3 The action referred to is a vote by the
legislature setting the terms and conditions of employment of the
public employees with whom the chief executive officer has been
negotiating. Thus, after months of negotiations and various types of
intervention by a mediator, a factfinding board, and PERB itself,
all designed to promote a voluntary settlement of contract terms,
the ultimate decision on wages, hours, and working conditions will
be made by the legislative body of the employer if the chief execu-
tive has not previously reached agreement with the union. Cer-
tainly, the chief executive and the legislative body cannot be consid-
ered a single employing entity. Indeed, in some cases they will be
significantly divided on many issues. Nonetheless, the chief execu-
tive of a local or state government usually has significant power in
the legislative body with respect to public employee collective bar-
gaining.
The effect of these provisions is to place the resolution of a
collective bargaining problem in the political arena. Prior to passage
of the legislative solution to the contract dispute, both the union
Id. § 209(3)(b).
Id. § 209(3)(a).
" Id. § 209(3)(e)(i).
' Id. § 209(3)(e)(ii).
Id. § 209(3)(e)(iii)-(iv).
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and the chief executive officer will probably take steps other than
merely participating in the legislative hearing in an attempt to in-
fluence the outcome of the vote. The political situation in the gov-
ernment involved will determine the form of this lobbying. The
contract dispute may have progressed to impasse not because the
executive opposed the union demands, but because the executive
wished to place the onus for the cost of the settlement on the legisla-
tive body. In such a situation the executive may not lobby vigor-
ously against the proposals of the union. Sometimes, both the union
and the employer will be in general agreement based on the fact-
finding report, but it will be more politically expedient to proceed
to legislative action rather than offend certain voters or certain mili-
tant union members by compromising on a contract. Where the
governmental body is experiencing fiscal difficulties in a time of
inflationary trends, it is to be expected that there will be greater
conflict surrounding the decision and there may be extensive voter
participation at the legislative hearing and in lobbying efforts. The
legislature will be faced with the uncomfortable task of weighing the
undesirable effects of a tax increase necessitated by improvements
for employees against possible retaliation by the unions at the next
election if the most important employee demands are not satisfied.
The relative importance of the union in the particular electoral
situation will always be a factor. Weak unions will obtain smaller
benefits from the executive through bargaining and from the legisla-
ture if the dispute goes to impasse. Further, a recognized fiscal crisis
can be expected to result in smaller gains or no gains at all, regard-
less of the strength of the union."
The legislative hearing procedures briefly described above no
longer apply to employees of school districts and higher education
facilities. Originally, the school boards, as the legislative bodies
with jurisdiction over these employees, were empowered to hold
legislative hearings and prescribe working conditions in the event a
voluntary settlement could not be reached 5 Unlike most other gov-
ernmental units in which the legislative body was removed from the
' In New York City, all unions were required to give up some existing benefits during
the fiscal crisis; this occurred despite the recognized political power of municipal employee
organizations. Financial Emergency Act, § 10, ch. 868, sec. 2, § 10, [1975] N.Y. Laws 1417
(McKinney). See Committee on Labor and Social Security Legislation, Impact of the Fiscal
Crisis and the State Financial Emergency Act on the Structure and Scope of Collective
Bargaining, 31 REcoRD oF N.Y.C.B.A. 386 (1976).
2 Ch. 392, sec. 2, § 209(3) (e), [1967] N.Y. Laws 1109 (current version at N.Y. Crv. SERv.
LAw § 209(3)(f) (McKinney Supp. 1977)).
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contract negotiations until mediation and factfinding failed, school
boards very often participated in the collective bargaining process.
This system was criticized by educational employees because it
"placed the power to make . . . final resolutions in the hands of a
party to the dispute . . ., i.e., the school board."36 As a result, in
1974 the power to impose a settlement was removed37 and, instead,
the parties "may" now be invited to a meeting by PERB "to explain
their positions with respect to the report of the fact-finding board,"
and "thereafter the legislative body [i.e., the school board] may
take such action as is necessary and appropriate to reach an agree-
ment."
38
This amendment apparently leaves the parties to an educa-
tional employee dispute without any mechanism for achieving final-
ity other than their own eventual agreement on a contract. If neither
party can change the status quo during the period before a new
contract is signed, such a procedure, it has been suggested, places
pressure on both parties to reach agreement.39 School boards, how-
ever, are permitted to modify unilaterally certain terms and condi-
tions of employment, 0 and the courts often have found that incre-
38 Experiments in Public Employment Dispute Resolution: The 1974 Taylor Law
Amendments, 30 RECORD OF N.Y.C.B.A. 568, 575 (1975).
37 The task force appointed by the Governor to propose an alternative procedure for the
resolution of educational employee impasses concluded that the legislative hearing was an
inappropriate procedure and should be abolished. In its report, the task force stated:
The policy of the Taylor Law is that public employers shall negotiate with employee
organizations and enter into written agreements with them concerning the terms
and conditions of employment.
These agreements do not prevail over duly enacted laws and local ordinances,
but rather depend in many aspects upon legislative action to become effective.
However, where legislative action is taken in the absence of agreement between
the parties, such action [the past experience, as analyzed by the Task Force in its
report, demonstrates] rarely brings about full agreement between the parties and
a final resolution of their dispute.
Stable employer-employee relations are thus enhanced by and in fact depend
upon a combination of legislative action and agreement by the parties.
Where the parties have exhausted the statutory impasse procedures, and have
been unable to reach agreement, PERB should have clear authority to continue all
appropriate efforts to assist the parties in achieving agreement.
Taylor Law Task Force, Report to Governor Malcolm Wilson 4 (May 8, 1974). The legislature,
however, restricted the proposed amendment to educational employees. See ch. 443, [1974]
N.Y. Laws 1314 (codified at N.Y. Civ. SEarv. LAw § 209(3)(f) (McKinney Supp. 1977)).
N.Y. CIv. SERv. LAW § 209(3)(f) (McKinney Supp. 1977) (emphasis added).
39 Experiments in Public Employment Dispute Resolution: The 1974 Taylor Law
Amendments, 30 RECORD OF N.Y.C.B.A. 568, 584 (1975).
," See, e.g., Central School Dist. No. 1 v. Wappinger Cent. School Faculty Ass'n, 5 PuB.
EMP. REL. BD. 5-3074 (Bd. 1972) (unilateral change permitted where necessary for schools
to operate). Furthermore, although PERB has found that the employer is guilty of a refusal
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ments due under an expired contract need not be paid during a
period of negotiations." Thus, the pressure to settle may rest en-
tirely on the union.
BINDING INTEREST ARBITRATION IN NEW YoRK
The finality provisions with which this paper is most concerned
were enacted in 1974 when subsection 4 was added to section 209 of
the Taylor Law.42 Representing a 3-year experiment scheduled to
expire on July 1, 1977, this subsection establishes compulsory inter-
est arbitration as the final means of achieving a settlement when
negotiations between a local government other than New York City
and its police or fire officers reach an impasse.
The initial steps to be taken pursuant to section 209(4) parallel
closely the procedures described above for impasses in other
branches of government employment.43 Once PERB determines that
an impasse in collective bargaining exists, it must, on the request
of a participant, render assistance in achieving a resolution of the
dispute, and it may intervene, without a party's request, on its own
motion.44 If the parties have agreed on procedures to be invoked in
the event of impasse, such procedures are followed in an attempt to
achieve a settlement prior to PERB intervention. 5 If the agreed
to bargain if it unilaterally changes mandatory subjects of bargaining while a successor
agreement is being negotiated, see Triborough Bridge & Tunnel Auth. v. Local 1396,
AFSCME, 5 PuB. EMP. EL. BD. % 5-3037 (Bd. 1972), PERB does not have the power to restore
the status quo. See Jefferson County Bd. of Supervisors v. PERB, 36 N.Y.2d 534, 330 N.E.2d
621, 369 N.Y.S.2d 662 (1975).
" See, e.g., Corbin v. County of Suffolk, 54 App. Div. 2d 698, 387 N.Y.S.2d 295 (2d Dep't
1976); Board of Coop. Educ. Servs. v. PERB, 50 App. Div. 2d 832, 377 N.Y.S.2d 98 (2d Dep't
1975); Board of Educ. v. Poughkeepsie Pub. School Teachers Ass'n, 44 App. Div. 2d 598, 354
N.Y.S.2d 589 (2d Dep't 1974) (mem.).
11 See ch. 724, sec. 3, [1974] N.Y. Laws 1883, and ch. 725, sec. 3, [1974] N.Y. Laws
1887 (codified at N.Y. Civ. SERV. LAw § 209(4) (McKinney Supp. 1977)).
0 The initial § 209(4) procedures do differ slightly from those applicable to other govern-
mental employers under the jurisdiction of PERB as set forth in N.Y. Civ. SERv. LAW § 209(3)
(McKinney 1973 & Supp. 1977), discussed in note 27 supra. The time limits prescribed for
the requisite actions are set forth more specifically in § 209(4) than in § 209(3). Section 209(3)
apparently does not contemplate that the parties shall participate in the choice of a fact-
finder, whereas the parties to a police or firefighter dispute are given 10 days to agree on the
factfinder. Further, the powers of a police or firefighter factfinder are more clearly detailed
in § 209(4) than are the powers of factfinders appointed to other types of disputes under §
209(3). The rationale underlying these differences in procedure is unclear since there is no
definitive legislative history explaining the binding arbitration statute.
" N.Y. Civ. SERv. LAw § 209(4) (McKinney Supp. 1977). An impasse is deemed to exist
if the parties have not reached an accord at least 120 days prior to the end of the public
employer's fiscal year. Id. § 209(1) (McKinney 1973).
'3Id. § 209(2) (McKinney Supp. 1977).
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upon procedures do not produce a contract, or if there are no such
procedures, PERB appoints a mediator who is given at least 15 days
to effect settlement of the controversy.46 After 15 days, either party
may "request that their differences be submitted to factfinding
with advisory recommendations. 4
The parties may jointly select a factfinder, but if they are un-
able to agree within 10 days a factfinder is appointed by PERB from
its list of qualified persons. The factfinder is required, within 10
days of appointment, to "meet with the parties . . . either jointly
or separately, and [the factfinder] may make inquiries and investi-
gations, hold hearings, and take such other steps as [the factfinder]
may deem appropriate."4 If the contract dispute is not settled
within 30 days after the factfinder's appointment, he "shall make
findings of fact and recommend terms of settlement, which recom-
mendations shall be advisory only. ' 49 Thereafter, the parties have
10 days within which to agree on a contract. Failing agreement in
this period, PERB will "refer the dispute upon petition of either
party to a public arbitration panel." 0
41 Id. § 209(4)(a)-(b).
47 Id. § 209(4)(b).
4I Id.
42 Id.
The composition and procedures of the public arbitration panel are delineated in §
209(4)(c), which provides in pertinent part:
(ii) the public arbitration panel shall consist of one member appointed by the
public employer, one member appointed by the employee organization and one
public member appointed jointly by the public employer and employee organiza-
tion who shall be selected within ten days after receipt by the board of a petition
for creation of the arbitration panel. If either party fails to designate its member
to the public arbitration panel, the board shall promptly, upon receipt of a request
by either party, designate a member associated in interest with the public employer
or employee organization he is to represent. Each of the respective parties is to bear
the cost of its member appointed or designated to the arbitration panel and each
of the respective parties is to share equally the cost of the public member appointed
jointly. If, within seven days after the mailing date, the parties are unable to agree
upon the one public member, the board shall submit to the parties a list of quali-
fied, disinterested persons for the selection of the public member. Each party shall
alternately strike from the list one of the names with the order of striking deter-
mined by lot, until the remaining one person shall be designated as public member.
This process shall be completed within five days of receipt of this list. The parties
shall notify the board of the designated public member. The cost of the one person
designated is public member from the list submitted by the board is to be paid by
the board. The public member shall be chosen as chairman;
(iii) the public arbitration panel shall hold hearings on all matters related to the
dispute. The parties may be heard either in person, by counsel, or by other repre-
sentatives, as they may respectively designate. The parties may present, either
orally or in writing, or both, statements of fact, supporting witnesses and other
[Vol. 51:453
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This panel is tripartite in nature, with one member appointed
by each party and the third member chosen by mutual agreement.5 1
After conducting hearings on the issues, 52 the panel may act by a
majority vote unless the members representing the parties both re-
quest that the issue be resubmitted to the disputants for further
negotiations.5 3 Although certain considerations which may be rele-
vant to the panel's determination are enumerated in the statute,
examination of these factors is required only so far as the panel
"deems them applicable. '5 4 Thus, the panel is granted wide lati-
tude 5 in shaping its decision which is final and binding and not
evidence, and argument of their respective positions with respect to each case. The
panel shall have authority to require the production of such additional evidence,
either oral or written as it may desire from the parties;
(iv) all matters presented to the public arbitration panel for its determination
shall be decided by a majority vote of the members of the panel. The panel, prior
to a vote on any issue in dispute before it, shall, upon the joint request of its two
members representing the public employer and the employee organization respec-
tively, refer the issues back to the parties for further negotiations;
(v) the public arbitration panel shall make a just and reasonable determination
of the matters in dispute. In arriving at such determination, the panel may, but
shall not be bound to, adopt any recommendation made by the fact finder, and
shall, so far as it deems them applicable, take into consideration the following and
any other relevant circumstances:
a. comparison of the wages, hours and conditions of employment of the
employees involved in the arbitration proceeding with the wages, hours,
and conditions of employment of other employees performing similar
services or requiring similar skills under similar working conditions and
with other employees generally in public and private employment in
comparable communities;
b. the interests and welfare of the public and the financial ability of the
public employer to pay;
c. comparison of peculiarities in regard to other trades or professions,
including specifically, (1) hazards of employment; (2) physical qualifica-
tions; (3) educational qualifications; (4) mental qualifications; (5) job
training and skills;
d. such other factors which are normally or traditionally taken into
consideration in the determination of wages, hours and conditions of
employment.
(vi) the determination of the public arbitration panel shall be final and binding
upon the parties for the period prescribed by the panel, but in no event shall such
period exceed two years from the termination date of any previous collective bar-
gaining agreement or if there is no previous collective bargaining agreement then
for a period not to exceed two years from the date of determination by the panel.
Such determination shall not be subject to the approval of any local legislative body
or other municipal authority.
" Id. § 209(4)(c)(ii).
52 Id. § 209(4)(c)(iii).
" Id. § 209(4)(c)(iv).
' Id. § 209(4)(c)(v).
See Caso v. Coffey, 41 N.Y.2d 153, 359 N.E.2d 683, 391 N.Y.S.2d 88 (1976).
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subject to legislative approval. 6
In making its determination, the public arbitration panel
"may, but [is] not . . .bound to, adopt any recommendation
made by the fact finder. ' 57 In practice some arbitrations are con-
ducted as "show cause" proceedings to determine why the sub-
stance of the factfinding report should be modified or adopted."
Accordingly, comparison of a factfinder's recommendations and the
subsequent determination of the arbitration panel in the same case
often demonstrates considerable agreement as to the propriety of
salary increases and other benefits. In seventy percent of the cases
studied, salary recommendations and arbitration awards were the
same, 59 and even in those cases where differences were found, they
were "quite small." 0 As to nonsalary items, "arbitration panels
adopted the factfinding report on approximately 75% of the other
issues raised in the arbitration hearing."6 1
As was noted above, the panel is also directed to examine the
specified statutory criteria as well as "any other relevant circum-
stance," but only so far as "it deems them applicable." The
"elasticity" of this approach has been acknowledged by the court
of appeals,12 which has stated that an arbitration award will be
upheld on judicial review if the arbitrator's decision indicates that
the criteria "were 'considered' in good faith and that the. . . award
has a 'plausible basis . , ", It would seem that in times of
economic expansion, wage and benefit comparability, one of the
-" N.Y. Cirv. SRV. LAW § 209(4)(c)(vi) (McKinney Supp. 1977). The Taylor Law does not
require that a stenographic record be made of interest arbitration proceedings. Nonetheless,
the rules adopted by PERB grant the right to demand such a record with the "cost of such
record [to] be paid by the party requesting it or divided equally between both parties if both
made such request." 4 N.Y.C.R.R. § 205.7(d) (1976). Since arbitration awards are reviewable
in the courts, see Caso v. Coffey, 41 N.Y.2d 153, 156, 359 N.E.2d 683, 685, 391 N.Y.S.2d 88,
90 (1976), it appears advisable for both parties to request that minutes of the proceedings be
maintained in order to reserve their right to a full record on which to base a demand for
review. Moreover, the court of appeals has stated that where a party fails to request a
stenographic record, it cannot rely on the absence of a formal record as a ground for setting
aside the arbitration award upon judicial review. Id. at 159, 359 N.E.2d at 687, 391 N.Y.S.2d
at 92.
"N.Y. Civ. SERv. LAW § 209(4)(v) (McKinney Supp. 1977).
In a sample of 30 arbitration cases, it was found that 20 of the panels had adopted a
"show cause" posture with respect to the factfinding report. T. KocHAN, R. EHRENBERG, J.
BADERSCHEIDER, T. JICK & M. MIRONI, AN EvALUATION OF IMPASSE PROCEDURES FOR POLCE AND
FIREFIGHTERS IN NEW YORK STATE 223 (1977) [hereinafter cited as KOCHAN].
11 Id. at 288.
60 Id.
Of Id.
82 See Caso v. Coffey, 41 N.Y.2d 153, 359 N.E.2d 683, 391 N.Y.S.2d 88 (1976).
Id. at 158, 359 N.E.2d at 686, 391 N.Y.S.2d at 91-92.
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statutory criteria, 64 should be a significant factor in the arbitrators'
decision. If a governmental entity is financially healthy, there would
seem to be no reason for its employees to receive less compensation
than do similarly situated employees in communities of comparable
circumstances. In contrast, when the government involved in the
dispute is in the throes of a financial emergency, the "ability to pay"
criterion 5 of the interest arbitration statute should strongly influ-
ence the panel.
Of necessity, a public employer which intends to argue that the
benefits requested by the public employee organization should be
denied because the governmental ability to pay is limited must offer
adequate proof of fiscal limitations at the arbitration hearing. While
governmental ability to pay must guide the arbitrators' decision
when relevant, it can only be fairly and intelligently considered
when the panel is presented with fully documented references to
such subjects as real estate and sales tax collections, constitutional
debt limitations, the possibility of deficits, per capita income of
citizens, economic trends in the particular locality, and recent set-
tlements with other bargaining units by this governmental entity
and other employers."6 A public employer is not fulfilling its duties
to the public when it argues to the factfinder and the arbitration
panel that it cannot afford to grant the demands of the union but
fails to support its allegations with any documentation, and then
conducts an expensive judicial attack on the resulting unfavorable
arbitration award on the ground that the panel gave inadequate
consideration to the government's ability to pay. 7
" N.Y. Crv. SERV. LAW § 209(4)(c)(v)(d) (McKinney Supp. 1977).
" Id. § 209(4)(c)(v)(b).
" See id. § 209(4)(c)(v)(a).
61 A similar situation was presented in Caso v. Coffey, 83 Misc. 2d 614, 372 N.Y.S.2d
892 (Sup. Ct. Nassau County 1975). According to the original arbitrator's decision:
[Tihe County did not argue that it could not afford a larger increase; it did not
claim that the PBA demanded increase could create a budget deficit; it did not
argue that the demanded increase would place an unfair burden on the taxpayer.
Instead, it argued that a 6.5% increase was fair and reasonable.
Id. at 618-19, 372 N.Y.S.2d at 897. Nonetheless, the county challenged the award, which
included an 8.5% salary increase, on the ground that the arbitrators had not considered the
county's ability to pay and thus had failed to adhere to the statutory criteria. The supreme
court determined that the substantial evidence test was applicable and remanded the award
to the arbitration panel for development of a written record. 83 Misc. 2d at 620-23, 372
N.Y.S.2d at 899-901. Promulgating its second decision after 25 days of hearings and the
compilation of a massive amount of evidence, the panel awarded a 9.5% increase to the
Nassau policemen. This award was ultimately upheld by the court of appeals, which applied
a rational basis rather than a substantial evidence test while rejecting the contention that
the absence of a written record precludes confirmation of an award. Caso v. Coffey, 41 N.Y.2d
153, 158-59, 359 N.E.2d 683, 686-87, 391 N.Y.S.2d 88, 91-92 (1976).
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The court of appeals has recently stated that in a judicial pro-
ceeding to overturn an award the party challenging the arbitrator's
decision bears the burden of proof on the issue of the employer's
inability to pay.68 It specifically rejected the notion that "the burden
of proof to show that [the public employer] has the ability to pay
the award, should be placed upon the employees under a kind of
presumption that the [employer's] best offer during bargaining
prior to arbitration represented its good faith statement of the most
it could afford.""9 The quoted language may be interpreted as indi-
cating that the employer bears the burden of proof on this issue not
only when the award is challenged in court, but also from the very
beginning of the impasse proceedings under the Taylor Law.
Of course, the statute requires that the public arbitration panel
"shall make a just and reasonable determination of the matters in
dispute."7 This language apparently imposes a duty on the panel
to see that sufficient information is presented by both parties that
a "just and reasonable" determination is possible. Manifestly, a
panel would be derelict in its duty if it permitted an inexperienced
public employer representative to neglect an important aspect of
the statutory criteria. Nonetheless, the panel should not be respon-
sible for the adequacy of a party's presentation, nor should it be
required to do more than indicate areas where more facts could
profitably be presented.
Section 209(4) (c) (vi) provides that the arbitration panel's deci-
sion "shall be final and binding" and "shall not be subject to the
approval of any local legislative body or other municipal author-
ity."7 The final and binding nature of this determination is in
marked contrast to the method for resolving impasses in all other
sectors of employment under the jurisdiction of PERB. As stated
above, finality for these other employee groups is dependent on
legislative action or agreement by the employer and the public em-
ployee organization. In fact, when a voluntary settlement is
reached, the public employer may not be free to execute a truly
binding contract because the Taylor Law recognizes that certain
matters, such as increased funding, require legislative authorization
as well as the approval of the chief executive. 7 Thus, the Taylor Law
" Caso v. Coffey, 41 N.Y.2d 153, 159, 359 N.E.2d 683, 687, 391 N.Y.S.2d 88, 92 (1976).
" Id.
70 N.Y. Civ. SERV. LAW § 209(4)(c)(v) (McKinney Supp. 1977).
7' Id. § 209(4)(c)(vi).
72 Id. § 204-a(1) provides:
Any written agreement between a public employer and an employee organization
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prevents the executve from voluntarily binding the government
when the proposed contract term requires legislative implementa-
tion. Once an arbitration panel has ruled on a subject, however,
"the local government must yield to the dictates of the [arbitrators'
decision] . . .- 3
In City of Amsterdam v. Helsby,7" the court of appeals found
the Taylor Law finality procedure for police and firefighters proper,
despite the assertion that the arbitration mechanism represents an
unconstitutional delegation of legislative authority. The court held:
[t]here is no constitutional prohibition against the legislative del-
egation of power, with reasonable safeguards and standards, to an
agency or commission established to administer an enact-
ment .... Here, the Legislature has delegated to PERB, and
through PERB to ad hoc arbitration panels, its constitutional au-
thority to regulate the hours of work, compensation, and so on, for
policemen and firemen in the limited situation where an impasse
occurs. It has also established specific standards which must be
followed by such a panel .... We conclude that the delegation
here is both proper and reasonable.75
Consequently, if the arbitration panel follows the procedures of the
Taylor Law and adheres to the statutory criteria, it has the power
to establish terms and conditions of employment for police officers
or firefighters involved in an impasse. Moreover, such an award may
not be modified by the executive or legislative branches of govern-
ment. It would seem, however, that since the panel may not render
an award contrary to state law, its powers extend only insofar as the
determining the terms and conditions of employment of public employees shall
contain the following notice in type not smaller than the largest type used elsewhere
in such agreement:
"It is agreed by and between the parties that any provision of this agree-
ment requiring legislative action to permit its implementation by amend-
ment of law or by providing the additional funds therefor, shall not be-
come effective until the appropriate legislative body has given approval."
City of Amsterdam v. Helsby, 37 N.Y.2d 19, 27, 332 N.E.2d 290, 293, 371 N.Y.S.2d
404, 407 (1975). In upholding the constitutionality of § 209(4), in Helsby the court of appeals
stated that
once an impasse is reached and arbitration is sought, an attempt by the local
government to establish the hours of work, compensation, and so on, of its police-
men and firemen would be entirely inconsistent with the compulsory and binding
arbitration procedures established by the Legislature. In such a situation it should
be apparent that the local government must yield to the dictates of the arbitration
panel convened pursuant to [the Taylor Law].
Id. at 27, 332 N.E.2d at 293, 371 N.Y.S.2d at 407.
74 37 N.Y.2d 19, 332 N.E.2d 290, 371 N.Y.S.2d 404 (1975).
15 Id. at 27, 332 N.E.2d at 293, 371 N.Y.S.2d at 408 (citations omitted).
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local government is able to act on wages, hours, and working condi-
tions.
A comprehensive concurring opinion by Judge Fuchsberg offers
an illuminating discussion of the various problems encountered by
the Helsby court.71 Of most significance for the limited purposes of
this Article is a comment by Judge Fuchsberg with respect to the
taxation power:
I do not find the arbitrators' power to decide disputed labor de-
mands constitutes a delegation of power to impose taxes, whether
by way of invasion of local governments' authority to do so or
otherwise. The panels' decisions no doubt may affect the cost of
police and firefighters' services to their local governments, but the
cities or towns for whom they work remain free to make their own
decisions as to how they will meet such cost, whether by taxation,
cutbacks in spending or other means.7
This statement is in accord with the view that neither arbitration
awards nor collective bargaining agreements in the public sector are
self-implementing. If legislative authorization to finance a contract
or an arbitration award does not already exist, the executive must
secure such funding from the legislature, reduce services, decline to
fill vacancies, or take other management action to implement the
agreement. The important point is that either before or after con-
tract negotiations, the legislature must decide the appropriate level
for government operations and provide the required funding.
Judicial Review of Arbitration Awards
The method and standard of judicial review applicable to police
and firefighters' arbitration awards has been delineated by the court
of appeals. In Caso v. Coffey,75 the court reviewed the awards which
had been issued in the respective disputes between the County of
Nassau and its police and the City of Albany and its firefighters.
After noting that judicial review of compulsory arbitration awards
78 Id. at 28-42, 332 N.E.2d at 294-303, 371 N.Y.S.2d at 408-21 (Fuchsberg, J., concurring).
Judge Fuchsberg considered four challenges to the constitutionality of the arbitration provi-
sion of the Taylor Law: infringement on home rule, impermissible delegation of power to the
arbitrators, illegal grant of the taxing power to the arbitrators, and denial of equal protection.
He resolved all four contentions in favor of the statute's constitutionality. Id. at 30-42, 332
N.E.2d at 295-303, 371 N.Y.S.2d at 410-21.
" Id. at 41, 332 N.E.2d at 302, 371 N.Y.S.2d at 420, citing Dearborn Fire Fighters Local
412 v. City of Dearborn, 42 Mich. App. 51, 201 N.W.2d 650 (1972), aff'd by an equally divided
court, 394 Mich. 229, 231 N.W.2d 226 (1975).
7A 41 N.Y.2d 153, 359 N.E.2d 683, 391 N.Y.S.2d 88 (1976).
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is constitutionally necessary79 despite the legislature's failure to pro-
vide for such review in section 209(4) of the Taylor Law, Judge
Fuchsberg, writing for a unanimous court, carefully described the
appropriate procedures and standards to be followed and applied by
a court confronted with a challenge to a public arbitration panel's
award.
First, the court held that judicial review of compulsory arbitra-
tion awards is properly conducted under article 75, rather than arti-
cle 78, of the Civil Practice Law and Rules." The court explained
that article 75 is the "only statutory vehicle for the enforcement of
arbitration," and noted that it provides an existing structure to
guide the parties. Further, the real parties in interest in any chal-
lenge to a public arbitration panel award are the public employer
and the employee organization. Consequently, an article 78 pro-
ceeding, which would require PERB or perhaps the panel itself to
be parties respondent, would present unnecessary procedural and
practical difficulties."
Although article 75 was declared the appropriate procedural
vehicle for review of public arbitration panel determinations, the
standards to be applied by the courts are an expanded version of
those set forth in section 7511 of the Civil Practice Law and Rules82
for vacating voluntary arbitration awards. Whereas the usual rule
under article 75 is that a reviewing court will not vacate an arbitra-
tion award even if there has been a patent error of fact or law, 3 the
71 41 N.Y.2d at 156, 359 N.E.2d at 685, 391 N.Y.S.2d at 90, citing Mount St. Mary's
Hosp. v. Catherwood, 26 N.Y.2d 493, 260 N.E.2d 508, 311 N.Y.S.2d 863 (1970). In Mount St.
Mary's the court of appeals held that where arbitration is compulsory some judicial review is
necessary to satisfy the requirements of due process. Id. at 508, 260 N.E.2d at 516, 311
N.Y.S.2d at 874.
" 41 N.Y.2d at 156, 359 N.E.2d at 685, 391 N.Y.S.2d at 90. Nassau County asserted that
the proper mode of review in its action to annul the arbitrator's award was delineated in N.Y.
Civ. PRAc. LAw §§ 7801-7806 (McKinney 1963 & Supp. 1977) (article 78). In the companion
case, the Albany firefighters brought an article 75 proceeding, N.Y. Civ. Pac. LAw §§ 7501-
7514 (McKinney 1963 & Supp. 1977), to confirm the arbitrators' award; this was joined with
the city's article 78 suit to annul the award. Id. at 156-57, 359 N.E.2d at 685, 391 N.Y.S.2d
at 90. The court opted for the arguments favoring article 75 review since that statute would
bring the real parties in interest, the governmental body and the union, before the court and
allow them to advocate their positions directly. By contrast, article 78 review would force
PERB and/or the arbitrators to defend the award. The courts stated that since PERB does
not participate in the arbitration hearing or decision, it need not defend the resulting award.
With respect to the arbitrators, the court reasoned that as an ad hoc panel the arbitrators'
responsibility is to decide the dispute and not to defend that decision in court. Id. at 156-57,
359 N.E.2d at 685-86, 391 N.Y.S.2d at 90-91.
R1 Id. at 157, 359 N.E.2d at 685-86, 391 N.Y.S.2d at 90-91. See note 80 supra.
n N.Y. Civ. PRc. LAw § 7511 (McKinney 1963).
m Egregious errors of law or fact are not listed among the enumerated grounds for vacat-
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standard enunciated in Coffey measures awards "according to
whether they are rational or arbitrary and capricious."' -Noting that
a substantial evidence test had not been adopted, Judge Fuchsberg
explained that it is only necessary for the arbitrators' decision to
demonstrate that the statutory criteria had been considered and
that the award had a "plausible basis."85 Thus, the awards under
review in Coffey were easily upheld since in each arbitration the
specific statutory criteria had been carefully considered and ample
evidence presented to support the panel's findings. 6
Applying the standards announced in Coffey, the Appellate
Division, Fourth Department in City of Buffalo v. Rinaldo,7 re-
cently vacated a public arbitration panel's award in the dispute
between the City of Buffalo and the Buffalo Police Benevolent Asso-
ciation. The arbitration panel had been presented with extensive
evidence concerning the desperate fiscal condition of the City of
Buffalo. The Association argued that the panel should reject the
factfinder's recommendation of a six percent nonrecurring bonus
and instead award a ten percent salary increase. The majority opin-
ing an arbitration award under § 7511. See id. This is because the parties select their own
"'judges' and a mode of dispute determination not governed either by the rules of substan-
tive law or the rules of evidence which obtain in the courts." Transpacific Transp. Corp. v.
Sirena Shipping Co., S.A., 9 App. Div. 2d 316, 320, 193 N.Y.S.2d 277, 282 (1st Dep't 1959)
(citation omitted) (Breitel, J.), aff'd mem., 8 N.Y.2d 1048, 170 N.E.2d 391, 207 N.Y.S.2d 70
(1960). See also Wenger & Co. v. Propper Silk Hosiery Mills, Inc., 239 N.Y. 199, 146 N.E.
203 (1924); In re Spectrum Fabrics Corp., 285 App. Div. 710, 139 N.Y.S.2d 612 (1st Dep't),
aff'd mer., 309 N.Y. 709, 128 N.E.2d 416 (1955).
11 41 N.Y.2d at 158, 359 N.E.2d at 686, 391 N.Y.S.2d at 91, citing Mount St. Mary's
Hosp. v. Catherwood, 26 N.Y.2d 493, 260 N.E.2d 508, 3.11 N.Y.S.2d 863 (1970). The Mount
St. Mary's case arose under a New York compulsory arbitration statute, N.Y. LAB. LAW § 716
(McKinney 1965 & Supp. 1977), banning strikes by workers in voluntary hospitals and substi-
tuting arbitration to "safeguard their economic rights and to offset the curtailment of their
bargaining power." 26 N.Y.2d at 499, 260 N.E.2d at 511, 311 N.Y.S.2d at 867. The Mount
St. Mary's court recognized that consensual arbitration awards are subject to very limited
review. It decided, however, that due process requires more extensive review where the arbi-
trators' authority is derived from a statute rather than the voluntary agreement of the parties.
Thus, in cases of compulsory interest arbitration N.Y. Civ. PRAC. LAW § 7511(b) (McKinney
1963), which authorizes judicial inquiry into the propriety of the arbitrators' exercise of
jurisdiction, is read to include the question "whether the award is supported by evidence or
other basis in reason, as may be appropriate, and appearing in the record." 26 N.Y.2d at 508,
260 N.E.2d at 516-17, 311 N.Y.S.2d at 875. The court explained that since interest arbitration
is quasi-legislative in nature, judicial review is limited to determining that the award is not
"arbitrary or capricious," and has a "reasonable basis." Id. at 510, 260 N.E.2d at 517, 311
N.Y.S.2d at 876.
41 N.Y.2d at 158, 359 N.E.2d at 686, 391 N.Y.S.2d at 91-92 (citation omitted).
Id. at 158-59, 359 N.E.2d at 687, 391 N.Y.S.2d at 92.
11 56 App. Div. 2d 212, 392 N.Y.S.2d 146 (4th Dep't 1977), appeal filed, (Ct. App. Feb.
28, 1977).
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ion, written by the neutral chairman and concurred in by the union
member of the panel, awarded the police officers a five percent
salary increase.88 In reaching this determination, the majority bal-
anced the city's grave financial problems against the needs of the
police officers and the value of their services.89 With respect to the
city's ability to pay, the majority based its conclusion that the five
percent increase was within the city's means on a projected increase
in sales tax revenues and possible increases in state and federal
aid.90 Dissatisfied with the result, the city sought to vacate the
award.
The appellate division, in a unanimous decision, which is now
being challenged in the court of appeals, held that "there was no
rational basis in the record before the Arbitration Panel for conclud-
ing that the City had the ability to fund [the award] .... "I'
Rather, after a detailed analysis of the panel's proposed income
sources and of the budget of the City of Buffalo, the court found that
the overwhelming evidence demonstrated that the city would be
"I City of Buffalo v. Buffalo PBA, No. CA 0092 (Sept. 7, 1976) (Rinaldo, Sgaglione &
Casey, Arbs.), vacated sub nom. City of Buffalo v. Rinaldo, 56 App. Div. 2d 212, 392 N.Y.S.2d
146 (4th Dep't 1977), appeal filed, (Ct. App. Feb. 28, 1977).
S1 The majority accepted the city's contentions that it was running a large deficit and
was unable to borrow in the credit markets and that "[p]roperty abandonment, shrinking
tax collections, fleeting population and industry, high unemployment and a declining tax
base have compounded the City's problems." On the other hand, the panel also considered
the value of the services performed by the police officers and the effects of inflation on their
standard of living. It concluded that an increase was warranted. City of Buffalo v. Buffalo
PBA, No. CA 0092 (Sept. 7, 1976) (Rinaldo, Sgaglione & Casey, Arbs.), vacated sub nom.
City of Buffalo v. Rinaldo, 56 App. Div. 2d 212, 392 N.Y.S.2d 146 (4th Dep't 1977), appeal
filed, (Ct. App. Feb. 28, 1977).
0 The dissent by the city's arbitrator contained a very detailed examination of Buffalo's
finances, including its low bond rating and its difficulty in borrowing from commercial banks.
In substance, the dissenting opinion found that there was no evidence to support a probability
of increased state aid or the receipt of federal aid which could be applied to pay the arbitra-
tors' award. The dissent analyzed Buffalo's budget, tracing further probable areas of short-
falls and deficits. Turning then to comparability factors, the dissent found that Buffalo police
pay was above the national average and noted that no other Buffalo employees had negotiated
pay raises in the past 2 years. City of Buffalo v. Buffalo PBA, No. CA 0092 (Sept. 7, 1976)
(Casey, Arb. dissenting), vacated sub nom. City of Buffalo v. Rinaldo, 56 App. Div. 2d 212,
392 N.Y.S.2d 146 (4th Dep't 1977), appeal filed, (Ct. App. Feb. 28, 1977). As to the eight other
items before the panel, the arbitrators were unanimous.
91 56 App. Div. 2d at 218, 392 N.Y.S.2d at 149. The court noted that
[t]here was no rational basis in the record before the arbitration panel for conclud-
ing that the City has the ability to fund a three million dollar wage increase retroac-
tive to July 1, 1975 and any finding to the contrary must be based on pure conjec-
ture and speculation and without regard for the demonstrated facts of the cata-
strophic fiscal crisis confronting the City of Buffalo. The conclusion by the arbitra-
tors that such funding ability does exist is clearly arbitrary and capricious.
Id., citing Caso v. Coffey, 41 N.Y.2d 153, 359 N.E.2d 683, 391 N.Y.S.2d 88 (1976).
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unable to fulfill the financial obligation thrust upon it by the arbi-
trators' decision. Accordingly, the award was vacated and the dis-
pute was ordered submitted to new arbitrators upon the application
of either party.
In Rinaldo, the fourth department has erected the ability to pay
standard as a barrier to any wage increase, even if justified by the
other statutory criteria, where the governmental employer is in
acute financial difficulty and faced with continued and substantial
budget deficits and shortfalls. Presented with a "catastrophic fiscal
crisis," the court allowed the ability to pay standard to override the
other statutory criteria, in spite of the observation by the court of
appeals in Coffey that the statute only requires consideration of the
criteria "'so far as [the panel] deems them applicale.' ",92 In-
deed, it seems that the Rinaldo court, while phrasing its holding in
the language of the arbitrary and capricious standard, has, in effect,
applied the substantial evidence test. Such a standard directly con-
tradicts the court of appeals' holding that an arbitration panel's
determination is to be sustained if there is "any basis" for the con-
clusions of the panel and if it appears that "the criteria specified in
the statute were 'considered' in good faith . . . 3
The Effect of Compulsory Arbitration Under the Taylor Law
The tripartite arbitration panel created by the Taylor Law gen-
erally results in a situation where the neutral chairman has the
decisive vote. When the panel retires to discuss the evidence and
arguments and to formulate the award, the partisan panel members
will try to convince the neutral member to accept the position of the
party they represent. Ultimately, the neutral chairman must be
persuaded to accept a particular position; thus, each side is forced
to modify its demands so that its position becomes more acceptable
to the neutral. In effect, the discussion among the three members
of the panel amounts.- to the final round of negotiations over the
terms and conditions of employment. Additionally, prior to a formal
vote the panel has the power to "refer the issues back to the parties
for further negotiations."94 The resulting determination is thus
likely to be a document that both sides can "live with." In fact, sixty
percent of the arbitration awards issued in the 3-year experimental
period during which section 209(4) has been in effect have been
41 N.Y.2d at 158, 359 N.E.2d at 686, 391 N.Y.S.2d at 91 (citation omitted).
" Id. (citation omitted).
, N.Y. Civ. SERV. LAw § 209(4)(c)(iv) (McKinney Supp. 1977).
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unanimous,95 and it has been said that approximately eighty per-
cent of the awards confirmed the bargaining of the parties. 6
The value and merit of the experimental New York compulsory
arbitration scheme has been underscored recently in a major study
sponsored by the New York State School of Industrial and Labor
Relations at Cornell University." This study sought to determine
the effect, if any, of compulsory arbitration as the final impasse
procedure, on the ability of the parties to reach voluntary agree-
ments and on the level and distribution of wages and other terms
of employment. 8
Employing both macroanalysis, i.e., comparison and examina-
tion of negotiations between different groups and at different times,
and microanalysis, i.e., examination of the bargaining relationships
in individual negotiations, the Cornell study found that the change
in legislation did not have a major impact on the effectiveness of the
bargaining process in achieving voluntary settlements either prior
to impasse or at the mediation step of the impasse procedures.
Between 1968 and 1973, when deadlocked negotiations were subject
to factfinding and a legislative hearing but not to compulsory arbi-
tration, approximately fifty percent of police negotiations and forty-
three percent of firefighter negotiations annually went to impasse. 0
In 1975, the first year of the compulsory arbitration statute, 71.1%
of the police negotiations and 60.5% of the firefighter negotiations
went to impasse.' Using contract "rounds," the instance of nego-
tiations of a new contract, rather than calendar years as the basis
for comparison, the study found that in the last round under fact-
finding, forty-eight percent of police units and fifty-two percent of
firefighter units went to impasse; while seventy-six percent of police
units and fifty-eight percent of firefighter units went to impasse in
the first round of negotiations under the compulsory arbitration
statute.10
As the authors of the study indicated, however, not all of the
statistical increase in the use of impasse pr6c'edures was caused by
,7 KOCHAN, supra note 58, at 267.
Id. at 259.
Id. The research was funded by the National Science Foundation, Division of Research
Applied to National Needs, and carried out in cooperation with the New York State Public
Employment Relations Board.
Id. at ii.
'7 Id. at 162-63.
,7 Id. at 33.
101 Id.
"7 Id. at 35.
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the adoption of compulsory arbitration. 103 They noted that during
the years under the factfinding statute a higher percentage of police
and firefighter units were going to impasse each successive round of
negotiations and that a "narcotic effect" or habitual dependence on
the use of impasse procedures was developing. As a result, there was
a significant probability that a bargaining unit which went to im-
passe in a given round of negotiations would go to impasse in the
next round of negotiations.'04 The authors concluded that by the
time compulsory arbitration was adopted, there was an increasing
reliance upon impasse procedures to resolve bargaining disputes
involving police and firefighters.0 5
As a further test of the net effects of the change in the law, the
Cornell study compared the experience of police and firefighters
with the impasse levels for teachers in the State during 1972 and
1975.106 The study found that the increase in the rate of impasse in
police and firefighter bargaining after the enactment of the arbitra-
tion provisions was consistent with an increase in the rate of im-
passe in teacher negotiations from 56.2% in 1972 to 66.1% in 1975.107
The authors suggested "that part of the explanation for [this] in-
crease in impasses reflects either the changing economic and politi-
cal climate in the state or represents a deterioration of the bargain-
ing systems for both teachers and police and firefighters."'0 8
Indeed, after an extensive microanalysis, the study found that
an impasse was more likely to result when the bargaining relation-
ships had the following characteristics:
a high level of hostility between the union and management repre-
sentatives, unions that engaged in political, public relations, and
negotiations types of pressure tactics, management negotiators
"I Id. at 95.
,01 Id. at 35-40, 89. Specifically, the study found that sixty-three percent of those units
that went to impasse the first time they bargained also went to impasse in their second round
of bargaining. The percentage of impasse use in round three of bargaining increased to
seventy-seven percent for those units which went to impasse in round two and eighty percent
for those units which went to impasse in rounds one and two. In contrast, the impasse rate
in round three of bargaining for those units which did not go to impasse in round one or two
was forty percent and the impasse rate of those units which did not go to impasse in round
two, but did go in round one of bargaining was forty-seven percent. Id. at 89.
,o Id. at 89.
' The authors noted that the bargaining experiences of teachers and police and firefigh-
ters are not ideally suited for comparison. Nonetheless, teacher units were chosen because
they were the only public employee groups subject to the same environment as police and
firefighters and for which bargaining data was available. Id. at 41.
207 Id. at 43.
I !d.
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that lack authority, and to a slightly lesser extent relationships
where the union negotiators were under intense pressure from the
rank and file, and where the union and the municipality hired
outside negotiators. '
Moreover, these pressures or sources of impasse were not unique to
the last round of bargaining under factfinding. Rather, they had also
affected impasse experience in previous rounds of negotiations. ' 0
Because the same factors apparently recur from year to year and
continually exert roughly the same effects, the authors of the Cor-
nell study concluded that "the bargaining system was getting no
better or no worse at coping with these pressures . . . as time went
on.""' Since the aggregate rate of impasse is continually rising,
however, it appears that an ever growing number of bargaining rela-
tionships are being affected by these sources of impasse."'
The study found that the 1974 arbitration amendment caused
an increase of approximately sixteen percent in the probability that
an impasse would occur."' Further analysis revealed that this in-
creased probability of going to impasse was limited to small and
medium size upstate cities which did not have a previous history of
heavy reliance on impasse procedures."4 Those jurisdictions in the
state which had relied on impasse procedures under factfinding were
apparently unaffected by the change in the statute.15 Thus, one can
speculate that the increased rate of impasse under the arbitration
statute, primarily limited to jurisdictions with no prior history of
impasses, reflects the continuation of the observed trend of deterio-
ration in bargaining relationships as much as it reflects an increased
reliance on impasse procedures induced by the change in the stat-
ute. Additionally, it is probable that some increase in cases arose
because public employee unions in small and medium size com-
munities had bargaining power-the right to go to arbitration-for
the first time.
Regarding the stage of impasse procedures at which settlements
were reached, the study found that the statute was partially respon-
sible for an approximately fifteen percent increase in the probability
IN Id. at 75-76.
"' Id. at 76-77.
" Id. at 77.
11 Id.
"' Id. at 83.
"' Id. at 86.
115 Id.
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that the parties would go to the terminal step of the procedures." 6
The authors noted, however:
When compared to the other factors that were found to affect the
probability of settlement or impasse, the change in the statute
ranked about third or fourth in importance. The level of hostility
in the bargaining relationship, the size of the city, the extent to
which the union employed pressure tactics in negotiations, and the
use of outside negotiators by the union all were found to be more
important or at least equally important as the change in the im-
passe procedures.'1 7
The Cornell study examined rates of movement, "the process
of making compromises or concessions in an effort to produce an
agreement,""' and found that the adoption of compulsory arbitra-
tion "had little or no effect on the various measures of movement
examined.""' 9 Thus, the predicted "chilling effect" on the negotiat-
ing process does not appear to have materialized in New York. In-
stead, the researchers concluded that the level of experience of nego-
tiators, the level of hostility in the relationship, and the use of
pressure tactics had more effect in impeding movement than the
availability of arbitration.'20
Voluntary agreement might, in fact, be encouraged by compul-
sory arbitration if the costs involved in an arbitration proceeding
were shifted to the parties. Under the Taylor Law, PERB bears the
costs of the neutral chairman of the arbitration panel unless that
person is selected by the parties and is not appointed by PERB.'2'
In practice, this has meant that the parties rarely bear the cost of
the public member. Moreover, few parties pay additional fees to the
members of the panel associated in interest with them. 22 Thus,
unless the disputants order a stenographic record, the arbitration
process itself is inexpensive. If one were to agree with the generally
accepted view that arbitration should be discouraged and settle-
,, Id. at 85.
,, Id. at 95.
,, Id. at 117.
,, Id. at 118.
1' Id. at 95, 119. The Cornell study also found that the negotiators interviewed in the
course of the research had a "dismal" view of the movement or progress that could be
expected in the course of negotiation. Id. at 119. For a discussion of the general effectiveness
of collective bargaining, see notes 282-87 and accompanying text infra.
M' N.Y. Civ. SERv. LAw § 209(4)(c)(ii) (McKinney Supp. 1977).
'2 KocHAN, supra note 58, at 300. The study also reports that "[s]pecial attorney or
consultant fees . were paid by 8 percent of the public employers and 28 percent of the
unions." Id.
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ment by negotiations encouraged, then one would conclude that the
present system of cost allocation under the Taylor Law does not
discourage the use of arbitration and thereby does not encourage
voluntary agreements.
A subject of interest in time of financial hardship is the level
of awards granted by arbitration panels as compared to the level of
settlements reached through negotiations without binding arbitra-
tion. The Cornell study attempted to determine whether the exis-
tence of compulsory arbitration had an effect on the cost of negoti-
ated collective bargaining agreements and whether arbitration
awards are higher or lower than negotiated settlements. The re-
searchers concluded that the existence and availability of binding
arbitration is not a significant factor in the cost of negotiated con-
tracts.'2 Similarly, although the average arbitrated wage increase
for police and firefighters was slightly lower than the average negoti-
ated wage increase, the study concluded that the difference was
statistically insignificant.124
According to PERB figures comparing negotiated settlements
to arbitration awards for local police and firefighters, in 1975 salary
increases in negotiated police contracts averaged 10.3% while arbi-
tration awards averaged 8.7%. Firefighter increases in the same year
averaged 8.1% in negotiated settlements and 6.7% in arbitration
awards.125 As of October 1976, fifty-two police units had reached
negotiated settlements averaging a 7.4% increase over the prior
year, while the twenty-three arbitration awards resulted in a 6.6%
average increase. The twenty-eight firefighter contracts negotiated
as of October 1976 resulted in an average 8.1% increase, while six
arbitration panels issued awards with an average increase of 7.8%.121
Ultimately, these statistics and the Cornell study suggest that arbi-
tration has a more significant effect on the distribution than on the
size of wage increases among public employees. Apparently, arbitra-
tion does not necessarily place either the employer or the employee
at a disadvantage. As the authors of the Cornell study stated, "we
have no evidence to indicate that the arbitration statute per se, or
the use of the arbitration procedure, systematically benefitted one
side of the bargaining table or the other." 12
" Id. at 215-16.
2, Id. at 216.
'' Public Employment Relations Board News No. 3, at 9 (Mar. 1976).
'' Id. No. 9, at 1, 6 (Oct. 1976).
' KOCHAN, supra note 58, at 218.
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The operation and effectiveness of the compulsory interest arbi-
tration panels is further illustrated by a brief review of some judicial
decisions reviewing awards issued pursuant to section 209(4) of the
Taylor Law. As noted previously, the court of appeals in Coffey
enforced the awards challenged therein because the arbitration pan-
els had properly considered and applied the statutory standards to
the evidence presented by the parties. In an earlier case, a lower
court considered a challenge to an arbitration award by seven police
officers and their union. '28 In arriving at a wage increase figure, the
panel had considered the total cost of employee compensation in-
cluding pension benefits and increments due under the expired con-
tract. The plaintiff police officers had demanded a percentage in-
crease in addition to the increments, but the panel awarded a per-
centage increase in which the cost of the increments was included
as a component. Finding that the issue of salary, which had been
submitted to the panel, included consideration of the increments
the court refused to disturb the award.
A recent case, Albany Police Officers Union v. City of Albany,' 9
vividly portrays the determined resistance of one local government
to the Taylor Law finality procedures for police and firefighter bar-
gaining disputes. Upon a petition filed with PERB in November
1975, the Albany Police Officers Union requested compulsory arbi-
tration on the ground that mediation and factfinding had failed to
resolve a bargaining impasse between the union and the City of
Albany. The court describes what followed:
The respondent City refused to select its member of the three-man
panel or to participate in the process for selection of the public
member of the panel. After one designee chosen to represent the
City declined to serve, PERB, by letter dated December 16, 1975,
designated appellant Corning to serve as the City's member of the
panel. After appellant Coming declined to participate, he was no-
tified by PERB that "[i]f the city of Albany does not choose to
participate in the panel proceedings, there is no alternative but for
the panel to proceed with two members." Hearings were held be-
fore the two-member panel on four separate dates and, although
notified of each hearing date, the City was not represented at any
of the hearings. Prior to the opening of the final hearing, on April
9, 1976, a representative of the respondent City's corporation coun-
sel's office offered a packet of documents to the chairman of the
121 Ogdensburg PBA v. PERB, 8 PUB. EMP. REn. BD. 8-7015 (Sup. Ct. Lawrence County
1975).
121 55 App. Div. 2d 346, 390 N.Y.S.2d 475 (3d Dep't 1977).
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panel. Despite the fact that these documents were introduced in
an irregular manner, without an appearance or any testimony con-
cerning them, the panel ultimately decided to accept them as part
of the record and to examine them. The respondent Union, in
contrast, introduced numerous documents and presented wit-
nesses in support of its various positions.'30
In June 1976, the panel issued its determination granting some
of the union demands and rejecting others. Appealing from an order
confirming the award, the city argued that the panel had "failed to
accord the City's proof proper status," had based the award on the
erroneous assumption that money could be borrowed to pay the
salary increases, had incorrectly used salary comparisons with sur-
rounding communities, and, finally, had overlooked the city's abil-
ity to pay.1 31 The appellate division rejected the city's first conten-
tion, noting that: "The [panel's] report contains a summary of the
economic problems facing the City, as described in the material,
and explains why more weight was given to data other than the
City's materials in reaching the conclusion as to the fiscal condition
of the City.' '3 2 The court also found no merit in the city's other
contentions and concluded that "the panel herein considered the
statutory criteria for balancing the ability of the City to pay with
the interests of the employees and . . . the award has a 'plausible
basis.' "'a
Another challenge to an arbitration award, Bethlehem Steel
Corp. v. Fennie,'34 which was brought by the local government's
principal taxpayer,' 35 illustrates the strengths of the arbitration pro-
cess as well as the need for intelligent use of the statutory proce-
dures. In May 1975, a factfinder issued a report in a contract dispute
,3 Id. at 347, 390 N.Y.S.2d at 476.
,' Id. at 348-49, 390 N.Y.S.2d at 477.
,32 Id. at 348, 390 N.Y.S.2d at 477.
' Id. at 349, 390 N.Y.S.2d at 477.
83' 56 Misc. 2d 968, 383 N.Y.S.2d 948 (Sup. Ct. Erie County 1976).
"= The court, noting that the City of Lackawanna had intervened in the proceeding
brought by the taxpayer corporation, did not decide whether the taxpayer alone would have
had standing to challenge the arbitration result. Nonetheless, the court did state that § 7511
of the Civil Practice Law and Rules, N.Y. Civ. PRAc. LAw § 7511(b)(2)(i) (McKinney 1963),
"specifically gives status to an aggrieved taxpayer." 86 Misc. 2d at 975, 383 N.Y.S.2d at 952.
The Bethlehem Steel court also declared that General Municipal Law § 51 and Civil Service
Law § 102 "are considered authority for granting status to petitioner to bring this proceed-
ing." 86 Misc. 2d at 975, 383 N.Y.S.2d at 952. The cited laws permit taxpayer suits against
officers of local government "to prevent any illegal official act," N.Y. GEN. MUN. LAW § 51
(McKinney Supp. 1977), and "to restrain illegal payment of salary or compensation" and
"enjoin violation of the civil service law," N.Y. Civ. SFV. LAw § 102(1), (3) (McKinney 1973).
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between the Lackawanna Police Benevolent Association and the
City of Lackawanna recommending that policemen receive a nine
percent wage increase. Although a settlement on this basis seemed
probable, the issue ultimately proceeded to binding arbitration and
the city appointed its safety commissioner, a former captain in the
police department, to represent its interests on the tripartite
panel.'36 The safety commissioner, a Mr. Janus, had actively sup-
ported the city's position in the prior negotiations with the Benevo-
lent Association. He assured the city's chief negotiator that he
agreed with the factfinder's salary recommendations and repre-
sented that he would adhere to the city's position throughout the
arbitration proceedings.' In the time between the appointment of
the arbitrators and the first meeting of the panel, however, a may-
oral election was held and the incumbent administration was de-
feated. It became obvious that the safety commissioner would lose
his position and return to his former post as police captaim Al-
though the city's negotiator realized that an apparent conflict of
interest now existed, he did not demand a replacement, but only
complained to PERB and relied on the statements of the commis-
sioner that "he would remain steadfast in supporting the positions
of the City.""' Contrary to his assurances, the commissioner voted
with the union representative on all salary matters before the panel.
Thus, the award provided for a fifteen percent wage increase for
patrolmen and a twenty percent increase for superior officers, with
an additional ten percent increase for the second year of the con-
tract.
The public member dissented on the salary issue, stating that
the majority's award was excessive and challenging the propriety of
this arbitration. The court quoted from the dissent with approval:
"Theoretically, if each is representing the interests of those who
selected them and since they are in agreement as to the issues of
Salary and Duration; this award should not be necessary. Since the
advocate members of the arbitration panel are able to agree it
should be possible to refer the issues back to the parties to sign a
collective bargaining agreement. This is clearly not the case in this
impasse.
"As the Public Panel Member, I must represent the interest
'1' 86 Misc. 2d at 971, 383 N.Y.S.2d at 950.
,17 Id. at 969-72, 383 N.Y.S.2d at 949-50.
1' Id. at 972, 383 N.Y.S.2d at 950.
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of the public and I find that the interests of the citizens of Lacka-
wanna will not be served by the award."'1'
Finding that the arbitration was "improper" in that the safety
commissioner "intentionally misled the City,""14 the court com-
mented:
[The City negotiator] was certainly naive to be taken in by Mr.
Janus' assurances but his poor judgment, whether unintentional or
deliberate, should not deprive the city of a fair arbitration. Mr.
Janus' representations that he would uphold the fact finder's re-
port, if not false and untrue before the elections, were certainly
false and untrue after the election. 4 '
Consequently, the court annulled the arbitration award and ordered
that another arbitration be commenced.
Although its effect is not entirely clear, section 209(4) of the
Taylor Law appears to have had a favorable impact on contract
negotiations with police and firefighters. At the very least, the dire
predictions of opponents to compulsory arbitration have not been
borne out. Indeed, in a great many cases the tripartite nature of
New York's public arbitration panels has afforded the opportunity,
which is lost in the legislative hearing procedure, for the parties to
reach a voluntary agreement through their panel representatives. In
the nearly 3 years of the compulsory arbitration experiment, the
courts have established the constitutionality of the scheme and the
framework for judicial review of the arbitration awards. Moreover,
it is evident from the several decisions discussed above that the
judiciary is able and willing to protect both parties' right to equal
representation on the panel and to a fair determination. At the same
time, however, the courts appear willing to enforce the arbitration
awards when the proper procedures have been followed and the
arbitrators' decision rests on a rational basis. The statute is not
without problems, of course, and a number of reform proposals have
been offered.
Before examining these proposals for legislative modification of
section 209(4), it is helpful to analyze several other statutory
schemes for impasse resolution, including the New York City
Collective Bargaining Law (NYCCBL) and the comparable laws of
several other jurisdictions.
'3' Id. at 973, 383 N.Y.S.2d at 951.
"' Id. at 974, 383 N.Y.S.2d at 952.
", Id. at 972, 383 N.Y.S.2d at 950 (emphasis in original).
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FINALITY IN NEW YORK CITY
Section 212 of the Taylor Law permits local governments to
enact "provisions and procedures" for the regulation of public em-
ployee relations which are "substantially equivalent" to the Taylor
Law."' The effect of the exercise of such a local option is to render
the provisions of section 209 inapplicable to the local jurisdiction.
Utilizing its rights under section 212, New York City has enacted
the NYCCBL, which provides procedures for the resolution of bar-
gaining impasses, including mediation and the issuance of a final
and binding report by an impasse panel.14 3 This law is administered
by the Board of Collective Bargaining, a body composed of three
neutral members, two labor members, and two City of New York
members.' The chairman of the Board is chosen from among the
neutral members and functions as the director of the Office of
Collective Bargaining.1 5 The bargaining procedures under the
NYCCBL differ in many respects from those prescribed by theI'ay-
lor Law. The discussion here will be confined to those differences
which affect the finality procedures in New York City.
As originally enacted in 1967, section 1173-7.0(c) of the
NYCCBL contained provisions for factfinding, but the recommen-
dations which resulted were advisory only and there was no statu-
tory finality procedure."4 Nonetheless, the City of New York main-
tained a policy of voluntary compliance with impasse panel recom-
mendations. In 1969, the Taylor Law was amended to require the
mayor of the City of New York to submit a plan dealing with the
need for a specified final step in the impasse procedures.'47
In order to develop proposed finality procedures for submission
to the state legislature, a series of meetings was conducted among
representatives of the City of New York, the Municipal Labor Com-
mittee, '48 and the Office of Collective Bargaining. Representatives
,42 N.Y. Civ. SERV. LAW § 212 (McKinney 1973).
"1 NEW YORK, N.Y. ADniN. CODE ch. 54, §§ 1173-1.0 to -13.0 (1975 & Supp. 1977).
"I NEW YORK, N.Y. CHARTER ch. 54, § 1171 (1976). City members are appointed by the
mayor and serve at his discretion. Labor members are designated by the Municipal Labor
Committee. They are also appointed by the mayor but may be removed only for cause or upon
a request for removal by the Municipal Labor Committee. These members, by unanimous
vote, appoint the impartial members to 3-year terms.
" Id., §§ 1170-1171.
'" See N.Y.C. Local Law No. 53, 1 [1967] N.Y. Local Laws 449-450.
147 Ch. 24, § 11, [1969] N.Y. Laws 79-80.
,19 The NYCCBL provides that membership in the Municipal Labor Committee is open
to any certified employee organization to which the law is applicable. NEW YORK, N.Y. ADMIN.
CODE ch. 54, § 1173-9.0 (1975). Subject to certain qualifications, id., § 1173-10.0, certifica-
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of the mayor's office, the Municipal Labor Committee, and the city
council rejected proposals to conform New York City procedures to
the Taylor Law as it then stood by requiring legislative action in
bargaining impasses. The city council leadership did not wish to
play the part of referee in labor disputes between the mayor and the
public employee unions. The unions, so long as they were denied the
right to strike, preferred a finality method where the ultimate deci-
sion would be made by third-party neutrals. Therefore, a system of
finality with a form of compulsory interest arbitration was agreed
"upon"' and enacted by the New York City Council in 1972.50
Under the present provisions of the NYCCBL, mediation is not
mandatory upon a finding of impasse, nor is it a prerequisite to the
use of other finality procedures. Instead, a mediation panel of one
or more persons is appointed on request of a party or upon the
initiative of the director of the Office of Collective Bargaining if he
determines that "collective bargaining negotiations . . . would be
aided by mediation." '' There is no fixed time within which the
mediation panel must complete its work.
An impasse in negotiations is deemed to exist when the Board
of Collective Bargaining, upon the director's recommendation,
"determines that collective bargaining negotiations. . . have been
exhausted, and that the conditions are appropriate for the creation
of an impasse panel .... -,'2 Once the impasse determination is
made, a panel is chosen by submitting a list of seven persons drawn
from the roster of neutrals maintained by the Office of Collective
Bargaining'53 to the parties, who then may indicate their preferences
in numerical order. The director appoints those persons who are the
most mutually acceptable choices.' Impasse panels commonly con-
tion is issued by the Board of Certification of the Office of Collective Bargaining to any public
or municipal employee organization whose primary purpose is to represent such employees
"concerning wages, hours, and working conditions." Id., § 1173.3.0(i), (j).
"I See Lindsay, Report Submitted Pursuant to Chapter 24, Laws of 1969, Designed to
Bring New York City's Labor Relations Practices Into Substantial Equivalence With the
Public Employees' Fair Employment Act 1-3, 6. The report also sought a consolidation of
jurisdiction over New York City public employment relations. It suggested placing mandatory
jurisdiction over nonmayoral as well as mayoral agencies. Id. at 3-5. In addition, it urged a
continuation of the policy excluding the city from the Taylor Law requirement that collective
bargaining agreements be concluded prior to budget submission dates. Id. at 7-8. A discussion
of other minor problem areas was also included. Id. at 8-10.
'11 N.Y.C. Local Law No. 2, 1 [1972] N.Y. Local Laws 158-160 (codified at NEW YORK,
N.Y. AD?&N. CODE ch. 54, §§ 1173-5.0(a)(8), -7.0(c)(3)(e),-7.0(c)(4), -7.0(f) (1975)).
M5' NEW YORK, N.Y. ADmN. CODE ch. 54, § 1173-7.0(b)(2) (1975).
152 Id., § 1173-7.0(c)(2).
' Id., § 1173-7.0(c)(1)-(2).
" Id., § 1173-7.0(c)(2).
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sist of either one or three members according to the agreement of
the parties or the determination of the director absent such agree-
ment. '55 It is important to note that inclusion on the roster of neu-
trals maintained by the Board of Collective Bargaining is by unani-
mous vote of the labor and city members of the Board. 5'
Pursuant to rules 5.10 and 9.3 of the Office of Collective Bar-
gaining, '57 the fees and expenses of mediation and impasse panels
are shared by the public employer and public employee organization
which are parties to the dispute, as is the cost of the mandatory
stenographic record made in impasse panel hearings. Thus, under
the city procedures unlike those of the state, the costs are imposed
upon the parties.
The NYCCBL grants impasse panels the power to
mediate, hold hearings, compel the attendance of witnesses and
the production of documents, review data, and take whatever ac-
tion it considers necessary to resolve the impasse. If an impasse
panel is unable to resolve an impasse within a reasonable period
of time, as determined by the director, it shall, within such period
of time as the director prescribes, render a written report contain-
ing findings of fact, conclusions, and recommendations for terms
of settlement.' 5
The language of this section indicates that impasse panels are en-
couraged to settle the bargaining dispute through mediation. Expe-
rience has shown that even if the parties do not reach formal agree-
ment through the panel's mediatory efforts, and a report and recom-
mendations are issued, very often the report reflects the parties'
advice to the panel as to certain informal agreements existing be-
tween them."'
The NYCCBL specifies certain standards which an impasse
panel is to "consider whenever relevant in making its recommenda-
tions for terms of settlement." ' These standards are similar to
' Id., § 1173-7.0(e).
' This practice has been followed even though the NYCCBL, id., § 1173-7.0(c)(1),
requires a majority including the vote of only one city and one labor member.
I" NEW YORK CrrY OFFICE OF COLLECTIVE BARGAmO, REVISED CONSOLIDATED RULES §§
5.10, 9.3 (1972).
11 NEW YORK, N.Y. ADMIN. CODE ch. 54, § 1173-7.0(c)(3)(a) (1975).
... See Anderson, The Impact of Public Sector Bargaining: An Essay Dedicated to Na-
than P. Feinsinger, 1973 Wis. L. REv. 986, 1101. See also Doherty, On Factfinding: A One-
Eyed Man Lost Among the Eagles, 5 PUB. PERSONNEL MANAGEMENT, 363, 366 (1976); Grodin,
Political Aspects of Public Sector Interest Arbitration, 1 INDUS. REL. L.J. 1, 14 (1976).
IN NEW YORK, N.Y. AnMIN. CODE ch. 54, § 1173-7.0(c)(3)(b) (1975) provides:
(b) An impasse panel ... shall consider whqrever relevant the following
standards in making its recommendations for terms of settlement:
[Vol. 51:453
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those expressed in section 209(4)(c)(v) of the Taylor Law.'6' Al-
though they have not been subject to judicial interpretation it is
clear that they would meet the constitutional requirement, outlined
in City of Amsterdam v. Helsby,162 that a compulsory arbitration
statute contain "specific standards which must be followed by [the
arbitration] panel.' 6 3 The NYCCBL directs the impasse panel to
consider "the interest and welfare of the public," but does not spe-
cifically include the criterion of "financial ability of the public em-
ployer to pay" which is found in the Taylor Law.'64 Nonetheless, the
Office of Collective Bargaining has consistently interpreted the sta-
tutory criterion "interest and welfare of the public" to include con-
sideration of the employer's financial ability to pay.'6 '
The NYCCBL does not specify a time within which the impasse
panel must submit its report and recommendations; this decision is
left to the director. The statute does provide that the report shall
be made public within seven days of its submission to the parties,
but this time may be extended up to thirty days to permit the
parties to conclude a negotiated agreement prior to publication. '66
If a contract is negotiated during this time, the report will not be
released except upon consent of the parties.' 7 If a contract is not
(1) comparison of the wages, hours, fringe benefits, conditions and character-
istics of employment of the public employees involved in the impasse proceeding
with the wages, hours, fringe benefits, conditions and characteristics of employ-
ment of other employees performing similar work and other employees generally in
public or private employment in New York City or comparable communities;
(2) the overall compensation paid to the employees involved in the impasse
proceeding, including direct wage compensation, overtime and premium pay, vaca-
tions, holidays and other excused time, insurance, pensions, medical and hospitali-
zation benefits, food and apparel furnished, and all other benefits received;
(3) changes in the average consumer prices for goods and services, commonly
known as the cost of living;
(4) the interest and welfare of the public;
(5) such other factors as are normally and customarily considered in the
determination of wages, hours, fringe benefits, and other working conditions in
collective bargaining or in impasse panel proceedings.
'e' See N.Y. Civ. SEav. LAW § 209(4)(c)(v) (McKinney Supp. 1977).
662 37 N.Y.2d 19, 332 N.E.2d 290, 371 N.Y.S.2d 404 (1975).
26 Id. at 27, 332 N.E.2d at 293, 371 N.Y.S.2d at 408.
'"N.Y. Clv. SERv. LAW § 209(4)(c)(v)(b) (McKinney Supp. 1977).
66 The City Council Committee on Civil Service and Labor on September 15, 1976,
turned down a proposal to amend the NYCCBL to add the ability to pay criterion on the
ground that such action would be superfluous. See N.Y. Times, Sept. 16, 1976, at 24, col. 2.
For a discussion of the consideration given the financial condition of New York City, see notes
201-03 and accompanying text infra.
6 NEw YORK, N.Y. ADMiN. CODE ch. 54, § 1173-7.0(c)(3)(d) (1975).
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negotiated during this time, the parties must indicate acceptance
or rejection of the panel report and recommendations.' A party
which rejects the report and recommendations may appeal to the
Board of Collective Bargaining for review." 9 In some cases, a party
may reject the findings of an impasse panel pro forma and yet not
pursue the rejection all the way through appeal because the findings
are basically acceptable.
If both parties accept the recommendations or if neither party
petitions to the Board of Collective Bargaining for review, the rec-
ommendations "shall be final and binding."' 170 There are, however,
significant checks on this finality. Impasse panels generally have
the power to consider and issue recommendations on any mandatory
subject of bargaining submitted by a party and any voluntary sub-
ject of bargaining submitted on consent of both parties. The recom-
mendations of an impasse panel, however, are subject to legislative
approval in those instances where they involve the enactment of a
law.'7 ' Furthermore, the panel's recommendations are binding only
upon the particular governmental agency participating in the con-
tract dispute submitted to arbitration. 7 ' These provisions would be
invoked, for example, if a panel were asked to rule on a matter
within the ultimate jurisdiction of the civil service commission. The
panel would be limited to the issuance of an advisory opinion and
an alternative proposal to be implemented in the event the civil
service commission does not act. Further, if an impasse panel were
to rule on a subject which must be implemented by action of the
,68 Id., § 1173-7.0(c)(3)(e).
169 Id., § 1173-7.0(c)(4)(a).
Io Id. This section also provides that the Board of Collective Bargaining "may review
recommendations which have been rejected" but not appealed; this action has never been
taken.
171 Id., § 1173-7.0(c)(3)(e).
172 Id., § 1173-7.0(c)(3)(c), which provides:
(c) The report of an impasse panel shall be confined to matters within the
scope of collective bargaining. Unless the mayor agrees otherwise, an impasse panel
shall make no report concerning the basic salary and increment structure and pay
plan rules of the city's career and salary plan. If an impasse panel makes a recom-
mendation on a matter which requires implementation by a body, agency or official
which it [sic] not a party to the negotiations: (i) it shall address such recommenda-
tion solely to such other body, agency or official; (ii) it shall not recommend or
direct that the municipal agency or other public employer which is party to the
negotiations shall support such recommendation; and (iii) it may recommend
whether a collective bargaining agreement should be concluded prior to such imple-
mentation. Any alternative recommendations proposed by an impasse panel in the
event such implementation does not occur shall not exceed the total cost of the
original recommendations.
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city council or the state legislature, the award would be advisory in
nature until the legislature acted.
The panel's authority is further qualified by the requirement
that its reports and recommendations comply with federal and state
wage guidelines. Thus, in Uniformed Firefighters Association v.
City of New York, 173 the Board affirmed the determination of the
impasse panel but held that the challenged wage recommendations
were subject to approval by the Federal Cost of Living Council. 74
Subsequent to passage of the New York City Financial Emergency
Act, '75 the Board ruled on an impasse panel report concluding that
certain considerations justified a fractional departure from the wage
guidelines established by the Emergency Financial Control Board.
The Board of Collective Bargaining reduced the wage increase to
conform to the guidelines."6 Finally, the NYCCBL, in marked con-
trast to compulsory arbitration under the Taylor Law,7 7 provides
that the determination of a New York City impasse panel is subject
to the approval of the legislature when a law must be amended or
enacted' 78 and can only bind the governmental agency involved in
the dispute.7 9 Although there has been no judicial interpretation of
this restraint on the impasse panels, the authors are of the opinion
that an impasse panel award which contravened the budget voted
by the city council could not be fully implemented without an
amendment to the budget. To date, such a situation has not arisen.
Impasse panel recommendations may be reviewed by appeal to
the Board of Collective Bargaining. " The statute provides strict
time limits for filing of papers and issuance of the Board's decision.
Appeals normally are decided upon the papers filed by the parties,
occasionally after oral argument before the Board, and usually
within 30 days after the notice of appeal is filed.'8 ' Review is based
' No. B-7-73 (Board of Collective Bargaining Nov. 21, 1973).
,7' Id., slip op. at 4.
'7' Ch. 868, [1975] N.Y. Laws 1405 (McKinney).
,T' See Local No. 3, IBEW v. City of New York, No. B-8-76 (Board of Collective Bargain-
ing Aug. 11, 1976).
'I N.Y. Civ. SERv. LAW § 209(4)(c)(vi) (McKinney Supp. 1977).
, NE W YORK, N.Y. ADMIN. CODE ch. 54, § 1173-7.0(c)(3)(e) (1975).
,T Id., § 1173-7.0(c)(3)(c).
' Id., § 1173-7.0(c)(4).
,s, Id., § 1173-7.0(c) (4)(d). Notice of appeal must be filed and served upon the other party
within 10 days after receipt of the impasse panel's recommendations. If there is no final
determination by the Board within 30 days of the filing of the notice of appeal or within 40
days of a rejection notice which the board reviews upon its own initiative, see note 170 supra,
the panel's recommendation is deemed to be adopted. The director may extend these periods
for an additional period not to exceed 30 days. Id., § 1173-7.0(c)(4)(a), (d).
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on the record and evidence before the impasse panel182 and is guided
by the statutory criteria that must be considered by the panel.13
The Board is aided by rule 5.10 of the Office of Collective Bargain-
ing,' 4 which requires that hearings before the impasse panel be
stenographically recorded.
The Board of Collective Bargaining has adopted a standard of
review for impasse panel determinations comparable to the test
applied by the courts in reviewing an administrative agency deci-
sion under article 78 of the New York Civil Practice Law and
Rules. 8 The Board has stated its policy as follows:
We do not conceive it to be our function in such proceedings to
substitute our judgment, in determining the facts and adjudicat-
ing the merits, for that of an impasse panel. Our principal statu-
tory responsibility is to examine the record to determine whether
the parties have been afforded a fair hearing and whether the
record provides substantial support for the result reached by the
impasse panel; if it does, the fact that an interested party or that
the Board might be able to conceive other results is not controlling.
If the impasse panel has afforded the parties full and fair oppor-
tunity to submit testimony and evidence relevant to the matter in
controversy; unless it can be shown that the Report and Recom-
mendations were not based upon objective and impartial consider-
ation of the entire record; and unless clear evidence is presented
on appeal either that the proceedings have been tainted by fraud
or bias or that the Report and Recommendations are patently
inconsistent with the evidence or that on its face it is flawed by
material and essential errors of fact and/or law, the Report and
Recommendations must be upheld. 8'
182 Id., § 1173-7.0(c)(4)(b).
'= In those appeals in which prejudice is alleged, the NYCCBL incorporates by reference
the grounds for vacating an arbitration award provided by N.Y. Civ. PRAc. LAW §
7511(b)(1)(i)-(iii) (McKinney 1963). In such cases, the Board is empowered to direct a hearing
on these issues separate and apart from the record of the impasse panel. NEW YORK, N.Y.
ADmiN. CODE ch. 54, § 1173-7.0(c)(4)(b) (1975). The Board must reach a decision within 30
days of the close of this hearing or the panel's recommendation will be adopted. The director
has the discretion to extend this period for an additional period not exceeding 30 days. Id., §
1173-7.0(c)(4)(d). No such appeals have been brought as of this writing.
Im NEW YORK CrTy OFFICE OF COLLECTIVE BARGAINING, REVISED CONSOLIDATED RULES § 5.10
(1972).
"I N.Y. Civ. PRAc. LAW § 7803 (McKinney 1963) provides that questions raised in an
article 78 proceeding may only concern a determination of whether there has been a failure
to perform a legal duty, whether the official body is acting or is prepared to act in excess of
jurisdiction, whether a decision is the result of procedural violations or an abuse of discretion,
or whether a decision reached after a legally prescribed hearing is supported by substantial
evidence.
I City of New York v. Podiatry Soc'y, No. B-23-72, slip op. at 8-9 (Board of Collective
Bargaining Dec. 11, 1972).
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The substantial evidence test applied to impasse panel reports
under the NYCCBL is different from the standard of review adopted
in Coffey, where the court of appeals ruled that determinations of
Taylor Law arbitration panels should be accorded an expanded ver-
sion of article 75 review." 7 It may be, however, that very little sub-
stantive difference will emerge from experience with the two stan-
dards of review. Both the courts and the Board of Collective Bar-
gaining will be concerned with procedural fairness and with the
existence of record evidence to support the conclusions of the inter-
est arbitration panel, and neither reviewing forum will substitute its
judgment for that of the panel if it appears that the statutory cri-
teria were considered.
The Board of Collective Bargaining may "affirm or modify the
panel recommendations in whole or in part," and it may set aside
the report and recommendations if it finds that the rights of a party
have been prejudiced. 8 If the Board does not act within the statu-
tory time periods, the recommendations are deemed adopted. 8' The
NYCCBL provides that a final determination of the Board of Collec-
tive Bargaining "shall be binding upon the parties. . ." and "shall
constitute an award within the meaning of article seventy-five of the
civil practice law and rules."'80 The binding effect of a Board deter-
mination, like the decision of an impasse panel, is qualified by the
proviso that it is subject to legislative action when a law must be
amended or enacted.'19
No decision wherein the Board of Collective Bargaining re-
viewed the recommendations of an impasse panel has ever been
appealed to the courts. Should such a case be brought, it seems
probable that the courts will apply the same "expanded" article 75
review to New York City interest arbitration determinations as was
mandated in Coffey for Taylor Law interest arbitration decisions."'
From the preceeding description of finality under the
NYCCBL, it is apparent that the procedure and substance of im-
passe resolution in New York City differs in certain respects from
the binding finality procedures provided by the Taylor Law. Al-
though impasse panels have the authority to mediate and are
1" 41 N.Y.2d at 156, 359 N.E.2d at 685, 391 N.Y.S.2d at 90.
lu NEW YORK, N.Y. ADmiN. CODE ch. 54, § 1173-7.0(c)(4)(c). See note 183 supra.
It' NEW YORK, N.Y. ADMIN. CODE ch. 54, § 1173-7.0(c)(4)(d) (1975).
1 Id., § 1173-7.0(c)(4)(f) (1975).
"' Id., § 1173-7.0(c)(4)(e).
2 For a discussion of the standard of review applied in Coffey see notes 82-85 and
accompanying text supra.
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strongly encouraged by the statute to do so, the appointment of a
mediator is not mandatory under the NYCCBL and mediation is
undertaken only when circumstances indicate that it might be pro-
ductive. Unlike the two-tier Taylor Law system of factfinding fol-
lowed by binding arbitration, the NYCCBL requires a single proce-
dure wherein the impasse panel conducts a hearing, finds the facts,
applies the appropriate law, and then issues its decision. The deci-
sions of NYCCBL panels are appealable first to the Board of Collec-
tive Bargaining and then to the courts via article 75. Under the
Taylor Law, interest arbitration awards are directly appealable to
the courts by an article 75 proceeding. New York City impasse pan-
els are composed solely of neutrals, in contrast to the tripartite
structure of Taylor Law panels. The Board of Collective Bargaining,
which conducts the initial review of impasse panel recommenda-
tions, however, is a tripartite body.
Experience Under NYCCBL Impasse Procedures
Over 411 contracts have been concluded since the NYCCBL
was amended in 1972 to provide for binding interest arbitration.'
Impasse panel awards have been issued in 32 of the 411 contracts
open for negotiations. 19 4 Ten more cases were settled after appoint-
ment of a panel but before issuance of the award. The staff of the
Office of Collective Bargaining estimates that as many as two-thirds
of the awards issued represent awards written to confirm informal
agreement between the parties.
In New York City police and firefighter negotiations since 1972,
impasse panels have been employed by the Patrolmen's Benevolent
Association twice"9 5 and by the Uniformed Firefighters Association
once. '9 By agreement of the parties, the two police panels ruled on
different aspects of the same contract dispute. Thus, of a total of
20 police and firefighter contracts settled since 1972, only two con-
113 In 1972, the City of New York and certain of its "independent agencies" negotiated
with 249 units. [1972] OCB ANN. REP. 21. By the close of 1976, a continuous process of
consolidation reduced the number to 97.
"I In 1972 there were 125 dispute cases filed with the OCB. [1972] OCB ANN. REP. 21.
In 1973 there were 86, in 1974 there were 113, and in 1975 there were 119. [1975] OCB ANN.
REP. 21. The 1976 report has not yet been issued. Records of the OCB have been used for
this discussion.
"I City of New York v. PBA, No. 1-124-75 (Office of Collective Bargaining Aug. 10, 1976),
aff'd, No. B-12-76 (Board of Collective Bargaining Sept. 13, 1976); PBA v. City of New York,
No. 1-115-74 (Office of Collective Bargaining Apr. 30, 1975).
"I Uniformed Firefighters Ass'n v. City of New York, No. 1-105-73 (Office of Collective
Bargaining Nov. 11, 1973), aff'd, No. B-7-73 (Board of Collective Bargaining Nov. 21, 1973).
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tracts have required resolution by impasse panels.
Of the thirty-two awards issued by impasse panels under the
finality provisions of the NYCCBL, nine were taken to the Board
of Collective Bargaining for review. Six reports and recommenda-
tions were appealed by the union involved, one was appealed by the
city, and in two cases both the union and the city sought review by
the Board. These latter two cases, involving federal and state wage
guidelines, are discussed above. 97 The lone city appeal was brought
after an impasse panel, responding to a well-presented union case,
granted public health sanitarians larger raises than other inspec-
torial titles had received due to a showing that the sanitarians were
distinguishable on various grounds from the other titles. The Board
of Collective Bargaining unanimously affirmed the report and rec-
ommendations. 98 Of the six appeals brought by unions, all but one
sought review of wage increase findings by impasse panels. These
were all unanimously affirmed by the Board of Collective Bargain-
ing. ' The last union appeal was brought in a duty-chart, or work
schedule, dispute involving the Patrolmen's Benevolent Associa-
tion; the Board unanimously affirmed the panel's ruling that police
officers should work 10 more days per year than had theretofore
been the practice."°
In none of these cases did the Board find on appeal that the
panel had failed to consider and apply the statutory criteria. The
wage increase awards, with the one exception cited above, follow the
pattern of negotiated increases set by the city and other unions with
whom contracts had been concluded prior to the impasse proceed-
ing.
It may be taken as a significant measure of both city and union
general satisfaction with the impasse panel procedure that all rul-
ings on appeals from impasse awards have been joined in by the
neutral, city and union members of the Board of Collective Bargain-
ing. Further, none of the Board decisions have been challenged in
court. As a result, the authors believe that the impasse procedures
297 See notes 173-76 and accompanying text supra.
"s City of New York v. Local 768, AFSCME, No. B-11-74 (Board of Collective Bargaining
July 15, 1974).
I" District 1, PCD, MEBA v. City of New York, No. B-14-75 (Board of Collective Bar-
gaining May 21, 1975); Local 1455, AFSCME v. City of New York, No. B-8-75 (Board of
Collective Bargaining Mar. 24, 1975); City Employees Local 237 v. City of New York, No. B-
12-74 (Board of Collective Bargaining July 15, 1974); City of New York v. Civil Serv. Bar
Ass'n, No. B-4-73 (Board of Collective Bargaining Mar. 26, 1973); City of New York v.
Podiatry Soc'y, No. B-23-72 (Board of Collective Bargaining Dec. 11, 1972).
20 City of New York v. PBA, No. B-12-76 (Board of Collective Bargaining Sept. 13, 1976).
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of the NYCCBL are working well and that the impasse awards are
generally acceptable to the public employee representatives as well
as to the City of New York.
In recent years, with the increasing public awareness of the
financial exigencies faced by governmental employers in the State
of New York, questions have been raised concerning the ability of
impasse procedures to deal with fiscal problems of local govern-
ment. Of course, a third-party system for resolving bargaining im-
passes cannot be charged with finding a solution to a fiscal crisis.
All that can be demanded of impasse procedures is that they be
compatible with government efforts to restore fiscal soundness. In
this respect the New York City impasse panels have been responsive
to the employer's statements concerning its ability to pay as well as
its insistence that public services be maintained at the lowest possi-
ble cost. For example, in recommending settlement of the first
collective bargaining agreement between the Community Action for
Legal Services and the Legal Services Staff Association, the one-
member impasse panel, in his report and recommendations stated
that he was guided by the following criteria:
As impasse panelist, my task is to make recommendations which
satisfy the legitimate aspirations of LSSA to advance the interests
of its members, the mandated objective of CALS to provide a
meaningful legal assistance program for the poor of the City, the
real concern of the City to coordinate the labor relations of CALS
with that of other City agencies, and keep the program within the
budget and standards of the OEO. Moreover, I am bound by the
requirements of the City Labor Law [section 1173-7.0.c(3)(b)]
which requires that I take into account the interest and welfare of
the public. This has come to mean the ability of the City to pay
and the extent to which the services rendered may have been cur-
tailed if funds are unavailable.
It is clear that if salaries and other costs are increased and the
federal and the City governments fail to provide the funds to meet
the increased costs, services may have to be curtailed. This would
be unfortunate because it would mean not only that some poor
people could not be served but that CALS would have to lay off
some of its employees. A proposal which fully satisfies the legiti-
mate objectives of LSSA, CALS and City and OEO is not possible.
My recommendations are, admittedly, a compromise intended to
balance the conflicting interests and to have the least damaging
impact on the quality and range of services rendered by CALS and
the number of people it employs."0'
20 Community Action for Legal Servs., Inc. v. Legal Servs. Staff Ass'n, No. 1-110-74, slip
op. at 4-5 (Office of Collective Bargaining Nov. 13, 1974).
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Similarly, the report and recommendations of an impasse panel
in a contract dispute between the City of New York, the New York
City Health and Hospitals Corporation, and the Licensed Practical
Nurses of New York, Inc. noted:
The City has been going through a steadily worsening financial
situation, resulting in part from precisely the same causes as have
produced the Association's rationale for the salary proposals here.
It is appropriate to take into account, in weighing the proposals of
the parties and in developing a wage structure to recommend to
the parties, the very troubled economic condition of the City, just
as it is appropriate to take into account the effect of inflationary
pressures on the pay rates of the City's employees.
The panel also notes the current series of articles in the New
York Times regarding the adverse financial condition of the New
York City Health and Hospitals Corporation, the employer of per-
haps 80% of the employees in this unit. However sympathetic she
may be to the argument advanced by the Association and however
much she may recognize the hard work and contribution made by
the [employees] to the health care services rendered by the City,
she cannot consider that this is a time, when the principal em-
ployer is considered to be "bankrupt," to grant greater financial
recognition to this unit of employees than has been negotiated
elsewhere in the City."'
Finally, the language of the impasse panel appointed in the police
officer duty-charts dispute referred to above is significant. The
panel said:
Whatever the theoreticians may think in general about increasing
the length of the day, we must be concerned with the circumstan-
ces involved in this particular dispute occurring at a time of criti-
cal financial distress for the City. Here, as we have stated, the
highest priority should be given to maximizing the amount of
street time for which patrolmen are available.
New York has always been a pace setter in standards and
working conditions, but it is not improper in a time of imperative
need to bring City employees back to a standard comparable with
those enjoyed in similar communities throughout the country.0 3
Licensed Practical Nurses v. City of New York, No. 1-113-74, slip op. at 14, 19 n.1
(Office of Collective Bargaining Jan. 7, 1975).
2 City of New York v. PBA, No. 1-124-75, slip op. at 26-27 (Office of Collective Bargain-
ing Aug. 10, 1976), af'd, No. B-12-76 (Board of Collective Bargaining Sept. 13, 1976).
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COMPULSORY INTEREST ARBITRATION - A COMPARISON OF STATE
STATUTES
Eighteen states have adopted legislation mandating the use of
binding interest arbitration to resolve collective bargaining im-
passes between public employers and specific classes of public em-
ployees. 04 At the national level, binding arbitration of contract
terms between the federal government and its employees may be
used by the parties when authorized or directed by the Federal
Services Impasses Panel.2"5 The Postal Reorganization Act of 1970
provides for a system of binding arbitration if no agreement is
reached between the Postal Service and its employees within a spec-
ified period following the commencement of negotiations. 216 Many
of these arbitration statutes differ significantly because each is di-
rected toward a particular condition in the jurisdiction. The differ-
ences among the statutes also reflect the various theoretical ap-
proaches to the attainment of the dual goals of compulsory arbitra-
tion: preventing work stoppages and encouraging voluntary agree-
ments. In this section of this Article, several finality procedures will
be examined as a basis for comparison with the New York police and
firefighter arbitration statute.
The New York interest arbitration procedure is popularly
termed conventional arbitration. Under such procedures, an arbi-
tration panel resolves a bargaining impasse according to its best
judgment based, almost always, on express or implied statutory
standards. The "reasonable" award is a result of compromise and
may contain bits and pieces of the positions of both parties. Thus,
conventional arbitration "can function as a face-saving device for
both management officials and union leaders who perceive them-
selves under considerable constituent pressure not to compromise
their negotiating position. ' 207
Critics of conventional arbitration have argued that it has a
"chilling" or deterrent effect on the parties' incentive to bargain in
good faith. 28 The critics contend that the parties, believing that an
204 See note 15 supra.
2u Exec. Order No. 11,491, § 17, 34 Fed. Reg. 17,612 (1969), reprinted in 5 U.S.C. § 7301
app., at 398 (1970).
204 39 U.S.C. § 1207(c)-(d) (1970).
2 P. FEUILLE, FINAL OFFER ARBITRATION: CONCEPTS, DEVELOPMENTS, TECHNIQUES 7 (Public
Employee Relations Library No. 50, 1975) [hereinafter cited as FEuILLE].
"I See Stevens, Is Compulsory Arbitration Compatible with Bargaining?, 5 INDUs. REL.
Feb. 1966, at 38, 38-44. It has also been suggested that conventional arbitration does not in
fact eliminate strikes, see FEuILLE, supra note 207, at 10-11, and that awards issued by
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arbitrator will generally "split the difference," will maintain unreal-
istic bargaining positions whenever there is a possibility that bind-
ing arbitration will be instituted. Under the influence of such per-
ceptions, it is argued, each party believes that the arbitrator will
arrive at a result that is more favorable to that party than the result
offered by the other party immediately prior to going to arbitration.
The parties will then employ tactics designed to ensure arbitration
by bargaining without a sincere desire to reach agreement. As a
result, compulsory arbitration will replace collective negotiations as
the rule in contract disputes and will no longer be an exceptional
solution to an impasse situation.
This criticism provided the impetus for the development of an
alternative interest arbitration procedure, popularly termed final
offer arbitration. There are two variations of this arbitration
scheme: "total package" and "issue-by-issue." The former category
of final offer arbitration is exemplified by the Massachusetts finality
procedure for police and firefighter bargaining impasse, which re-
quires each party to submit simultaneously its last best offer to a
tripartite arbitration panel within 10 days of the close of hearings
on the dispute."'9 Limited to a choice of one of these last best offers
in its entirety, the arbitrators may not fashion a compromise award.
The arbitration panel is required to consider ten statutory criteria
in making its selection, and its award is final and binding upon the
arbitration panels are unduly inflated because the "process is insulated from market and
power constraints." Id. at 11. The initial assertion is "largely unfounded," as there has been
a noticeable absence of strikes by labor groups covered under compulsory arbitration legisla-
tion. Id. at 10. In New York, although this fact cannot be conclusively attributed to arbitra-
tion, affected employee groups have not gone on strike during the time § 209(4) has been in
effect. See KocHAN, supra note 58, at v. The second criticism, although conceptually plausi-
ble, also is not supported by recent research. Although it is difficult to isolate and assess the
effect of arbitration panels alone on wage increases, see J. STERN, C. REHMUS, J. LOEWENBERG,
H. KASPER & B. DENNIS, FINAL-OFFER ARmrrwATiON 29-30 (1975) [hereinafter cited as FNAL-
OFFER ARBrrATION], two studies have revealed that the only relation positively identified
between arbitration or the threat of its use and wages has been the "catchup" effect it has
had for employees who had initially suffered substandard earning levels. See id. at 31-32;
KocHAN, supra note 58, at 215-18. The Cornell study in fact concluded that "the arbitration
process had a stronger impact on the distribution of wages than on the average size of the
wage increases." Id. at 218.
11 Act of Nov. 26, 1973, ch. 1078, § 4, 1973 Mass. Acts 1135, reprinted in MASS. ANN.
LAws ch. 150E, § 9 app., at 320 (Michie/Law. Co-op 1976). The Massachusetts final-offer
arbitration mechanism may only be initiated upon a police or firefighter group's petition to
the state labor board. Four conditions must be met: (1) The police or firefighter organization
must have participated in mediation and factfinding; (2) 30 days must have elapsed since
the factfinder issued his report; (3) all proceedings for prevention of prohibited practices must
have been exhausted; and (4) an impasse still exists. Id.
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local legislative body as well as upon the parties. 10
Proponents of the final offer procedure have argued that under
the total package format "an arbitrator would not be free to compro-
mise between the positions of the parties but would be required to
accept one position or the other in toto . . . . [T]he theory is that
the process, instead of chilling bargaining, will induce the parties
to develop their most 'reasonable' position prior to the arbitrator's
decision." ' The procedure is said to act as a "strikelike" mecha-
nism in that it presents the possibility of potentially severe costs of
disagreement since either party "may lose the entire ballgame."
Thus, as Arnold Zack has stated, "[in theory, the prospect of the
other party's final offer being more appealing to an arbitrator, will
encourage each party to present an eminently reasonable final offer,
and, indeed, may even bring the parties to agreement without the
need to resort to an arbitrator's decision. 212
Ideal as the theory of total package final offer appears, it has
been criticized as having defects of its own. One commentator has
noted that there are two problems inherent in the total package final
offer approach: First, "the necessity of making an all or nothing
choice. . . tends to negate the proper utilization of standards," and
second, "if either party or both parties are in an inflexible position
on [a] major issue . . . the neutral may find himself in a position
where he cannot [render] an acceptable or even workable
award. 2 '3 Similarly, Joseph Grodin warns that in disputes involv-
ing multiple issues, if the bargainers lack experience and sophistica-
tion and therefore make unreasonable offers, the arbitrators' deci-
"0 According to one commentator, the mandatory factfinding process incorporated in the
Massachusetts statute, id., has become the "cornerstone of the entire impasse procedure."
Holden, Final-Offer Arbitration in Massachusetts: One Year Later, 31 ARB. J. 26, 28 (1976).
Under this hypothesis, factfinding represents the initial stage of a "two-step arbitration
proceeding." Id. at 29. Normally, the factfinder's recommendations are guided by the same
statutory criteria applicable to the arbitration proceeding, and they have usually been
acceded to in the latter proceeding. Id. Of the ten statutory criteria, the cost of living,
comparability with similar employees and communities, and the public employer's ability to
pay have been the most significant factors considered by the factfinders and arbitrators. Id.
at 33. The arbitration proceeding itself, as the final stage of the two-step process, has repre-
sented a "safety valve" for the parties because it allows them to retract terms which might
eventually be damaging to their package in a last best offer arbitration mechanism. Id. at
30.
21 Grodin, Either-or Arbitration for Public Employee Disputes, 11 INDus. REL. 260, 263
(1972) [hereinafter cited as Either-or Arbitration].
212 Zack, Final Offer Selection-Panacea or Pandora's Box?, 19 N.Y.L.F. 567, 573 (1974).
2,2 Anderson, Compulsory Arbitration in Public Sector Dispute Settlement-An Affirma-
tive View, in Dispute Settlement in the Public Sector 7-8 (Center for Labor and Management,
University of Iowa 1972).
[Vol. 51:453
COMPULSORY INTEREST ARBITRATION
sion will also be unreasonable."4 Fred Witney, one of the arbitrators
in a 1972 total package final offer decision involving the city of
Indianapolis and a municipal employees' union, notes that under
the sudden death procedure, an arbitrator may be presented with a
choice of undesirable alternatives due to the inclusion of a single
unreasonable item in an otherwise preferable package.1 5 Witney
explains that a more equitable settlement of the Indianapolis dis-
pute could have been reached if the arbitration panel had not been
limited by the total package final offer format.1
Mollie Bowers and David Cohen emphasize that collective bar-
gaining has historically sought "to achieve settlements which are
mutually acceptable to the parties."" 7 Clearly, it is in the best inter-
est of all concerned to reach an agreement which will form a basis
for workable labor-management relationships. Bowers and Cohen
state that
this objective is more likely to be achieved when both parties
emerge from an arbitration proceeding with some needs satisfied
rather than as total winners and total losers. Too frequently, and
understandably so, losers tend to devote a substantial amount of
energy getting back at the winner, under the terms of win-lose
awards and agreements."8
Grodin suggests that such problems could be alleviated if the
parties were encouraged or required to agree upon isolation of cer-
tain issues, or groups of issues, for submission to the arbitrator .2 1
22 Either-or Arbitration, supra note 211, at 264.
2,5 Witney, Final-Offer Arbitration: The Indianapolis Experience, MONTHLY LAB. REV.,
May 1973, at 20, 22-25.
"I Witney reports that the arbitration board was obliged to choose the city's final offer
because of the union's unreasonable demands concerning family insurance and sick leave
benefits. Id. at 22. Had the board been granted authority to exercise discretion, however, the
resultant award would have reflected the union's more reasonable wage demands. Id. at 23.
As recapitulated by Witney,
Although the Board kept faith with the parties and reached a decision based
on their instructions and on the evidence, it was not satisfied that the decision was
the right one under the circumstances of the dispute. Driven to the wall, the Board
picked the city's final offer as the most reasonable and rejected the union's as
unreasonable. But what may be "most reasonable" in a final-offer arbitration may
not meet the needs of the parties or conform to the tests of equity and desirability.
Id. Unconvinced that final offer arbitration compelled the parties to make reasonable de-
mands, Witney maintains that it may simply motivate the parties to seek the least unreason-
able offer. Id. at 25. Such an offer would have no guarantee of being reasonable in and of itself.Id.
I 27 Bowers & Cohen, Drafting Public Sector Arbitration Legislation, 30 Am. J. 253, 261
(1975).
214 Id.
21 Either-or Arbitration, supra note 211, at 264-65. According to Grodin, the greatest
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Other commentators have proposed an "issue-by-issue" format, in
which the arbitrator is not obligated to select the final offer of either
party in toto, but could choose between the final offers of the parties
on an issue-by-issue basis.22 The Michigan Police-Firefighters Arbi-
tration Act"' combines these proposals in its finality procedure,2
which has been described as follows: "(1) The panel makes the final
determination of issues in dispute and whether they are economic
or noneconomic; (2) the last, best-offer determination applies only
to economic issues; (3) non-economic issues are subject to conven-
tional arbitration; and (4) the opinion and award are to be writ-
ten."a
Issue-by-issue final offer selection has also not escaped criti-
cism. Peter Feuille and Gary Long note that the issue-by-issue pro-
cedure reduces the parties' incentive to reach agreement on any
single issue since they might conclude that inflexibility on particu-
lar issues is necessary in order to enhance the selectability of its
offers on other issues. 211 Grodin points out that the issue-by-issue
selection method does not induce the parties to narrow the area of
disagreement to the extent that the whole package selection method
problem with final offer arbitration is that as more issues are presented to the arbitrator, the
likelihood that he will be able to decide rationally between offers is greatly diminished. Id.
The intermixture of wage items, noneconomic benefits, and grievance procedures simply do
not lend themselves to effective evaluation. By isolating groups of issues, Grodin suggests that
the arbitrator would be able to render the offers a "high degree of principled evaluation." Id.
at 264. Alternatively, Grodin suggests that the parties be able to submit more than one final
offer. Id. at 264-65. This would allow the arbitrator somewhat more discretion and "flexibility
in effectuating priorities which he considers appropriate." Id. at 265. Gary Long and Peter
Feuille, commenting on the Eugene, Oregon final offer-scheme which allows the parties to
make two final offers, noted at least three beneficial aspects of the multiple offer concept:
First, the parties have more flexibility in making their presentations; second, the parties get
the benefit of "loading" one of the offers with politically expedient, but practically unreasona-
ble offers; and third, the second offer increases the uncertainty and "sudden death" aspect
of the final offer mechanism thereby increasing the likelihood of a negotiated settlement. See
Long & Feuille, Final-Offer Arbitration: "Sudden Death" in Eugene, 27 INDUs. & LAB. REL.
REv. 186, 197-98 (1974). Zack contends, however, that "[tihe risk of keeping the case before
the arbitrator is heightened by allowing only one final offer," and that therefore, the prospect
of voluntary settlement is increased if the parties are not permitted to present more than one
offer, nor allowed to modify the offer once it is submitted. Zack, Final Offer Selec-
tion-Panacea or Pandora's Box?, 19 N.Y.L.F. 567, 581 (1974).
220 See, e.g., Garber, Compulsory Arbitration in the Public Sector: A Proposed
Alternative, 26 ARB. J. 226, 232 (1971).
221 MIcH. COMP. LAws ANN. §§ 423.231-.247 (Supp. 1976-1977).
- Id. § 423.238.
m FINAL-OFFER ARmrrwATiON, supra note 208, at 46.
224 See Long & Feuille, Final-Offer Arbiration: "Sudden Death" in Eugene, 27 INDos. &
LAB. REL. REv. 186, 203 (1974).
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does.12 Moreover, as Arnold Zack has stated, "the final offer selec-
tion procedure does not easily lend itself to issue by issue determina-
tion. Multiple proposals are too often intertwined and dependent
upon one another. 2 26 Indeed, Charles Rehmus has observed that
Michigan arbitration panels have, at times, arrived at unusual and
inconsistent decisions on the question whether a particular issue is
economic, and thus subject to final offer arbitration, or nonecon-
omic, and thus subject to conventional arbitration.2 2
Evaluations of the Massachusetts and Michigan experiences
with their respective compulsory arbitration statutes indicate that
while there is a high rate of declared bargaining impasses, the final-
ity procedures do in fact encourage continued negotiations after
third-party intervention. A study of final offer arbitration in Massa-
chusetts found that in 1975, impasses were declared in fifty-three
percent of the police and firefighter negotiations.2 2 Only twenty-
eight percent of these impasses, however, continued on to petition
for arbitration, and of that number only sixteen percent required
issuance of an award.221 Similarly, under the Michigan statute, pub-
lic safety employees requested arbitration at the rate of one negotia-
tion in every three or four, but awards were rendered in only one
negotiation in six. 2 0 Presumably, the number of awards issued
would exceed the number of strikes if strikes were permitted. None-
theless, as Charles Rehmus noted, this ration "does not show that
the availability of arbitration has substantially eroded the possibili-
ties of settlement through the parties' own collective bargaining
efforts." 1'
The significant number of disputes which were settled in Mas-
sachusetts and Michigan after the petition for arbitration but before
issuance of an award demonstrates what commentators have termed
21 Either-or Arbitration, supra note 211, at 264.
221 Zack, Final Offer Selection-Panacea or Pandora's Box?, 19 N.Y.L.F. 567, 579 (1974).
22 FIAL-OFFER ARBrrATION, supra note 208, at 71. Rehmus reports that under final offer
arbitration for economic issues, there was no significant departure from practices that had
developed under conventional arbitration. See id. at 69-70. Specifically, parties who often
resorted to arbitration under the conventional format continued to do so under the revised
plan. Id. at 70. Parties who normally negotiated their agreements also remained true to their
previous habits. Id. Furthermore, the anticipated reduction of issues presented to the arbitra-
tors under the issue-by-issue format seemingly did not materialize in practice. Id.
225 P. Somers, An Evaluation of Final Offer in Massachusetts 23 (Nov. 1976), (Personnel
and Labor Relations Bulletin, Massachusetts League of Cities and Towns).
219 Id. at 26.
'0 FINAL-OFFER ARBrrPaTmN, supra note 208, at 53.
21 Id. at 53-54.
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the mediation-arbitration or "med-arb" effect. 22 The parties are
encouraged to continue negotiations by both the arbitration panel
and the statutory procedures. This effect is achieved through the
use of tripartite arbitration panels which, along with the statutory
procedures, encourage continued negotiations. The neutral arbitra-
tor may convey his informal opinion on the disputed issues to one
of the partisan panel members who can then inform the party he
represents of the opinion of the neutral arbitrator. After this party
modifies its position, the neutral panel member can use the same
technique with the other party, thereby, narrowing the dispute and
in some cases foregoing a settlement. As a result of the informal
nature of the proceedings, an effective neutral can resolve the par-
ties' differences far better than can the "threat" of final offer arbi-
tration.
The mediation process is further encouraged by the use of flexi-
ble time requirements and criteria. Under the law of both Massa-
chusetts and Michigan, the parties are not required to file their
statements of last best offers until a fairly late stage in the arbitra-
tion proceedings. 23 The broad scope of the criteria which the arbi-
tration panel must consider together with a provision allowing the
panels to examine all factors normally considered in collective bar-
gaining permits the parties in both states a degree of flexibility in
formulating their respective positions on bargaining issues.14 A
study of the Michigan compulsory arbitration experience revealed
that this flexibility in the timing and nature of final offers acted as
an open invitation to mediation during the course of the arbitration
proceedings.2 13 As Charles Rehmus observed, "any experienced ne-
22 Kagel & Kagel, Using Two New Arbitration Techniques, MONTHLY LAB. REV., Nov.
1972, at 11.
n3 Michigan's statute permits the parties to submit their final offers at any time in the
proceedings, and in both Massachusetts and Michigan, the parties are not required to submit
their final offers until the close of the arbitration hearings. Act of Nov. 26, 1973, ch. 1078, §
4(4), 1973 Mass, Acts 1135, reprinted in MAss. AN. LAWS ch. 150E, § 9 app., at 320 (Mi-
chie/Law. Co-op 1976); MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 423.238 (Supp. 1977).
2u Both statutes authorize the arbitrators to consider:
Such other factors, not confined to the foregoing, which are normally or tradition-
ally taken into consideration in the determination of wages, hours, and conditions
of employment through voluntary collective bargaining, mediation, fact-finding
arbitration or otherwise between the parties, in the public service or in private
employment.
Act of Nov. 26, 1973, ch. 1078, § 4(4)(9), 1973 Mass. Acts 1135, reprinted in MASS. ANN. LAWS
ch. 150E, § 9 app., at 321 (Michie/Law. Co-op 1976); MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 423.239(h)
(Supp. 1977).
"I Rehmus, Is a "Final Offer" Ever Final?, in ARBITRATION - 1974 - PROCEEDINGS OF
THE TWENTY-SEVENTH ANNUAL MEETING - NATIONAL ACADEMY OF ARBITRATORS 79 (1975). Reh-
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gotiator knows, a fixed and unalterable 'final offer' is ordinarily a
contradiction to the terms of good-faith bargaining. This is simply
because the parties' so-called 'final' offers frequently are not and
will not stay final."23
In addition to these implicit inducements to voluntary settle-
ment, both statutes explicitly provide that the arbitration panel, at
any time before rendering an award, can remand the dispute to the
parties for further negotiations for a period of up to 3 weeks. 21 Under
the Massachusetts provisions, the neutral panel member may serve
as a mediator at the request of the parties during this time period. s
Thus, the Massachusetts and Michigan mechanism can be termed
"mediation with clout." If it is necessary, the third party who is
petitioned to resolve the dispute can compel the parties to reach
agreement by utilizing the fear that the neutral will support an
award which incorporates the other party's final offer on the dis-
puted issues.
Clearly, the framers of the Massachusetts and Michigan arbi-
tration statutes intended their respective finality procedures to sup-
plement, not replace collective bargaining. As the studies discussed
above indicate, what has evolved in both jurisdictions is a system
which most frequently produces accommodative settlements rather
than normative awards. Nonetheless, despite the generally desira-
ble results of the two compulsory arbitration statutes, municipali-
ties in both Massachusetts239 and Michigan 20 have attacked the
constitutionality of their respective arbitration procedures, alleging,
inter alia, that the statutes impermissibly delegate legislative au-
thority to an ad hoc panel.24' While both provisions have withstood
mus finds that as part of the extended negotiation process during the arbitration hearing, not
only do the parties seek to modify their offers upon the basis of the other party's position,
but especially to accord with the feedback or inferences they can elicit from the neutral
arbitrator. Id.
n' Id. at 78.
211 Act of Nov. 26, 1973, ch. 1078, § 4(4), 1973 Mass. Acts 1135, reprinted in MASS. ANN.
LAws ch. 150E, § 9 app., at 320 (Michie/Law. Co-op 1976); MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 423.237a
(Supp. 1977).
23S RULES OF THE MASSACHUSETTS BOARD OF CONCILIATION AND ARBITRATION, ch. 2, §
2.09(B), reprinted in 1 MAss. LAB. REL. REP. 3019 (1974).
zu Town of Arlington v. Board of Conciliation & Arb., 352 N.E.2d 914 (Mass. 1976).
2 Dearborn Fire Fighters Local 412 v. City of Dearborn, 394 Mich. 229, 231 N.W.2d 226
(1975).
"I Other constitutional infirmities often alleged by recalcitrant municipalities include
violation of home rule charters, see, e.g., Town of Arlington v. Board of Conciliation & Arb.,
352 N.E.2d 914, 918 (Mass. 1976), contravention of the one man, one vote principle, see, e.g.,
id., at 920, and forfeiture of the municipality's right to tax, e.g., Dearborn Fire Fighters Local
412 v. City of Dearborn, 394 Mich. 229, 245, 231 N.W.2d 226, 230 (1975). These arguments,
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such challenges,242 other states have avoided the delegation question
by enacting statutes which require either that independent state
courts or "agencies" resolve bargaining disputes243 or that the public
employer must approve the interest arbitration awards before the
award becomes binding.2 4
4
In Nebraska, the legislature has created an independent court
of industrial relations with jurisdiction over industrial disputes con-
cerning terms, tenure, or conditions of employment involving gov-
ernmental service. 245 The court consists of five judges appointed by
the governor, 246 and its proceedings are conducted under the Ne-
braska civil rules of evidence .247 The court was originally created to
resolve labor disputes involving public utilities248 and proprietary
activities of the state, but the enabling legislation was amended in
1969 to include all governmental employees.249
as well as the assertion that compulsory arbitration constitutes an improper delegation of
legislative authority, have generally been rejected by the courts. See cases cited in note 242
infra.
2I Town of Arlington v. Board of Conciliation & Arb., 352 N.E.2d 914 (Mass. 1976);
Dearborn Fire Fighters Local 412 v. City of Dearborn, 394 Mich. 229, 231 N.W.2d 226 (1975),
aff'g by an equally divided court 42 Mich. App. 51, 201 N.W.2d 650 (1972). In addition to
these cases in Massachusetts and Michigan, compulsory arbitration has been held constitu-
tionally valid in the following cases: City of Biddeford v. Biddeford Teachers Ass'n, 304 A.2d
387 (Me. 1973); School Dist. of Seward Educ. Ass'n v. School Dist., 188 Neb. 772, 199 N.W.2d
752 (1972); City of Amsterdam v. Helsby, 37 N.Y.2d 19, 332 N.E.2d 290, 371 N.Y.S.2d 404
(1975); Harney v. Russo, 435 Pa. 183, 255 A.2d 560 (1969); City of Warwick v. Warwick
Regular Firemen's Ass'n, 106 R.I. 109, 256 A.2d 206 (1969); City of Spokane v. Spokane Police
Guild, 87 Wash. 2d 457, 553 P.2d 1316 (1976) (en banc); State ex rel. Fire Fighters Local 946
v. City of Laramie, 437 P.2d 295 (Wyo. 1968).
Not all compulsory arbitration legislation, however, has survived constitutional attack.
See City of Sioux Falls v. Sioux Falls Firefighters Local 814, 234 N.W.2d 35 (S.D. 1975), where
the court perceived compulsory arbitration to be an unconstitutional interference with munic-
ipal functions. In Pennsylvania, it was necessary to amend the constitution to allow compul-
sory arbitration, see PA. CONST. art. I, § 31, after the state's highest court had found a
previous arbitration statute unconstitutional, see Erie Firefighters Local 293 v. Gardner, 406
Pa. 395, 178 A.2d 691 (1962) (per curiam).
213 See, e.g., notes 245-57 and accompanying text infra.
24 See OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 11, § 548.9 (West Supp. 1977).
215 NEB. REv. STAT. §§ 48-801 to -838 (1974 Cum. Supp. 1976).
2I Id. § 48-804 (Cum. Supp. 1976). The statute provides that the legislature is to give
its advice and consent to the governor in his choice of appointments and that these "judges
shall be representative of the public." Id. The term of appointment is for 6 years. See id.
242 Id. § 48-809 (1974).
211 See ch. 178, § 1, 1947 Neb. Laws 586. The statute's coverage of employees of public
utilities is subject to the restrictions enunciated by the Supreme Court's holding in Associa-
tion of Street, Elec. Ry. & Motor Coach Employees v. Missouri, 374 U.S. 74 (1963). In that
case, the Court held that a provision of a Missouri statute mandating mediation of public
utility bargaining disputes was preempted by the National Labor Relations Act, 29 U.S.C.
§§ 151-169 (1970 & Supp. V 1975), to the extent that the state statute prohibited strikes
against employers whose businesses affect interstate commerce. Id. at 82.
24. Ch. 407, § 1, 1969 Neb. Laws 1405 (codified at NEB. Rav. STAT. § 48-801 (1974)).
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The court of industrial relations has been held to be an admin-
istrative body which has been granted a combination of administra-
tive, legislative, and judicial powers. 2 Specifically, in bargaining
disputes the court may order the parties to conduct good faith nego-
tiations251 and it may establish or alter the scale of wages, hours of
labor, or conditions of employment. 22 In settling disputes, the court
is directed to fashion terms "which are comparable to the prevalent
wage rate. . . and conditions of employment" enjoyed by similarly
situated workers. 253 The jurisdiction of the court is invoked by the
2 See School Dist. of Seward Educ. Ass'n v. School Dist., 188 Neb. 772, 785, 199 N.W.2d
752, 760 (1972).
2, NEB. REV. STAT. § 48-816 (1974).
251 Id. § 48-818. Although the statute provides the court with these remedial powers, the
extent to which the court may exercise them has been the subject of controversy. Section 48-
810.01 provides that:
Notwithstanding any other provision of law, the State of Nebraska and any political
or governmental subdivision thereof cannot be compelled to enter into any contract
or agreement, written or otherwise, with any labor organization concerning griev-
ances, labor disputes, rates of pay, hours of employment or conditions of work.
Id. § 48-810.01. Avoiding the apparent conflict between the sections of the statute, the
Supreme Court of Nebraska has held that an order of the court of industrial relations does
not force a governmental entity to enter into a contract, but is an exercise of the court's
"power to settle a dispute." School Dist. of Seward Educ. Ass'n v. School Dist., 188 Neb.
772, 783, 199 N.W.2d 752, 759 (1972).
2 NEB. REv. STAT. § 48-818 (1974). In establishing wages, hours, and working conditions,
the statute mandates that:
[Tihe Court of Industrial Relations shall establish rates of pay and conditions of
employment which are comparable to the prevalent wage rates paid and condi-
tions of employment maintained for the same or similar work of workers exhibiting
like or similar skills under the same or similar working conditions. In establishing
wage rates the court shall take into consideration the overall compensation pres-
ently received by the employees, having regard not only to wages for time actually
worked but also to wages for time not worked, including vacations, holidays, and
other excused time, and all benefits received, including insurance and pensions,
and the continuity and stability of employment enjoyed by the employees.
Id. The court of industrial relations has interpreted the statutory terms "comparable" and
"prevalent" to require it "to measure the settlement of the industrial dispute before the court
by the standards set by the 'peers' of the parties before the Court." Good, Public Employee
Impasse Resolution by Judicial Order: The Nebraska Court of Industrial Relations, 2 J.L. &
EDUC. 253, 256 (1973), quoting School Dist. of Seward Educ. Ass'n v. School Dist., No. 34, at
8 (Neb. Ct. Indus. Rel. Aug. 9, 1971). The Nebraska Supreme Court has stated that in
establishing who the "peers" of the parties are,
the standard now is one of general practice, occurrence or acceptance, but the
question of how general is general is left to the good judgment or feeling of the
judges. The requirement of similarity of working conditions helps the judge develop
that judgment or a receptivity to the proper connotation of the word 'prevalent'.
Similarity tends to decrease with increasing distance among what are to be com-
pared and to become more pronounced with increasing proximity.
Crete Educ. Ass'n v. School Dist., 193 Neb. 245, 254-55, 226 N.W.2d 752, 758 (1975), quoting
Fremont Educ. Ass'n, No. 50 (Neb. Ct. Indus. Rel. Mar. 14, 1972).
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filing of a petition by "[a]ny employer, employee, or labor organi-
zation, or the Attorney General of Nebraska on his own initiative
or by order of the Governor,115 4 with the limitation that parties to
disputes involving teachers must exhaust the mediation and fact-
finding requirements of the Nebraska Teachers' Professional Nego-
tiations Act25 before petitioning the court of industrial relations. 25
Finally, the decisions of the court of industrial relations are subject
to de novo review in the Supreme Court of Nebraska.257
Clearly, each variation of the compulsory interest arbitration
concept has advantages and disadvantages. Since none of these has
as yet shown itself to be beyond reproach, there appears to be no
convincing reason for New York to radically modify its procedures
or to abandon the conventional arbitration which has operated
effectively during the past 3 years. Moreover, unlike some states in
which the constitutionality of public sector conventional compul-
sory binding interest arbitration may be doubtful, the New York
judiciary has not only upheld, but has clarified and enlarged the
current Taylor Law provisions.
THE FUTURE OF INTEREST ARBITRATION
In considering the future of interest arbitration in New York,
it is necessary to evaluate the legal and practical issues raised by
both its supporters and its opponents and to assess the various
proposals for modification of the current Taylor Law provisions. Of
special significance are two proposals recently presented to the Leg-
islature. The Governor has submitted a bill which would eliminate
factfinding in police and firefighter disputes subject to the Taylor
Law and convert the binding interest arbitration provisions into an
advisory process.2 18 The proposal would establish a 2-year experi-
In reviewing determinations of the court of industrial relations, the Supreme Court of
Nebraska has adopted the dictionary definition of "comparable" as "having enough like
characteristics or qualities to make comparison appropriate," Crete Educ. Ass'n v. School
Dist., 193 Neb. 245, 253, 226 N.W.2d 752, 757, quoting WEaSTER'S TsmD NEW INTERNATIONAL
DICTIONARY 461 (unabr. 16th ed. 1971), and has limited its review to whether, as a matter of
fact, the labor market areas selected for comparison are sufficiently similar to the area in
which the bargaining dispute exists. See Omaha Ass'n of Firefighters Local 385 v. City of
Omaha, 194 Neb. 436, 440-41, 231 N.W.2d 710, 713-14 (1975); Crete Educ. Ass'n v. School
Dist., 193 Neb. 245, 253-55, 226 N.W.2d 752, 757-58 (1975).
2' NEB. REv. STAT. § 48-811 (1974).
2w Id. §§ 79-1287 to -1295 (1971).
1 Id. § 48-810.
21 See id. § 48-812.
2- N.Y.S. 1337, N.Y.A. 1637, 200th Sess. (1977).
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mental program similar in some ways to the legislative hearing
method now applied to other public employee disputes. The deter-
mination of the arbitration panel would have no effect until ap-
proved by the local legislature following a public hearing; if within
20 days after the public hearing the legislature does not vote to
approve or reject the determination, it shall be deemed approved.
The legislature would have no power to alter or amend the determi-
nation, and if it should be rejected the parties could renew their
negotiations." 9 In contrast to the Governor's proposal, PERB has
submitted a statement favoring continuation, without amendment,
of the interest arbitration statute. 6 ' Essentially, PERB has found
that the experiment seems to be working well and that a longer
period of experimentation is required before any definitive conclu-
sions concerning the statute's strengths and weaknesses can be
drawn.
26 1
In addition, the views of many concerned parties, including
representatives of state and local government, public employee un-
ions, and neutrals active in the public employment field, were ex-
pressed at a recent symposium on police and firefighter arbitration
sponsored by PERB.262 As evidenced by the opinions expressed at
this conference, the proposals to the Legislature will embody the
widely divergent views of labor and management. Public employer
groups at the PERB symposium strongly urged a return to the legis-
lative hearing procedure. They contended that the arbitration pro-
cess usurped the power of elected officials to set terms of employ-
ment for public employees and that the arbitrators who were now
given such authority in interest arbitration cases had no commit-
ment to the long term welfare of the government involved. Employer
representatives argued that the power to determine budget priori-
ties must rest with public officials and that binding arbitration
results in "the erosion and subversion of elective government. '23
Police and firefighter groups at the PERB conference were
united in their support of interest arbitration. They declared that
permitting an employer unilaterally to impose terms and conditions
of employment on its employees was unfair. Further, the union
211 Id. at 14.
2 New York State Public Employment Relations Board, Statement Concerning Binding
Arbitration for Officers or Members of any Organized Fire Dep't or Police Force of any
County, Town, Village or Fire District (Except City of New York) 8 (1977).
"' See id. at 8.
282 See Gov'T EMPL. REL. REP. (BNA) No. 687, at B-1 to B-13 (Dec. 13, 1976).
28 Id., at B-3.
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officials noted, interest arbitration has the beneficent quality of
imposing a finality, since "win or lose, it must be accepted."2 "' Both
the police and firefighter representatives warned of strikes if section
209(4) were not continued, asserting that a retreat from binding
arbitration would bring about "a revolt among the rank and file.1 265
Although doubts as to the constitutionality of section 209(4)
were settled by the court of appeals in City of Amsterdam v.
Helsby,218 the battle over the wisdom of compulsory binding interest
arbitration in the public sector will continue for some time to come.
The arguments relating to political power and the requirements of
fairness which were raised by the various interest groups at the
PERB conference have been voiced by many commentators.
The most basic objection to interest arbitration is that granting
the power to determine wages, hours, and working conditions of
public employees to arbitration panels is a significant encroachment
on an important power of elected officials in a democratic govern-
ment. At the core of this argument is the notion that the compulsory
binding interest arbitration statute grants to an arbitrator, as a
substitute for the legislative body, the power to render a decision in
a forum which is essentially a closed legislative process from which
other competing political forces are excluded. Included in this group
of critics who object to binding interest arbitration on the ground
that it is undemocratic are those who are in reality objecting to the
very idea of collective bargaining for public employees. 27 The Cor-
nell study discussed above268 found that those respondents to its
research questionnaires who were opposed to interest arbitration
also indicated that they were opposed to collective bargaining for
public employees.8 9 This Article does not propose to enter into an
extended philosophic dispute on the wisdom of collective bargaining
in the public or private sector: The authors firmly believe in collec-
25 Id.
2 Id., at B-4.
37 N.Y.2d 19, 26-28, 332 N.E.2d 290, 292-93, 371 N.Y.S.2d 404, 407-08 (1975).
"7 See R. SUMMERS, COLLECTIVE BARGAINING AND PUBLIC BENEFIT CONFERRAL: A JURISPRU-
DENTIAL CRITIQUE (WPE Monograph No. 7, 1976), wherein the author states: "Thus, the conflict
between democratic processes and public employee collective bargaining is inherent and
diminishes democratic decision making, for it requires the sharing of public authority with
private bodies (unions)." Id. at 4 (emphasis in original). Summers questions whether private
sector collective bargaining can be "justified," see id. at XI, and concludes that "public sector
collective bargaining is not a good thing for society and should be abandoned in all states
that have it." Id. at 57.
I" See notes 97-124 and accompanying text supra.
269 KOCHAN, supra note 58, at 312, 320.
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tive bargaining. This Article was based on the fact that collective
bargaining has been a matter of public policy for more than four
decades in the private sector and, in the last two decades, has been
extended by law to the public sector on the federal level and in most
states. The intent of the authors was to discuss the relevant experi-
ence with various methods for resolving the disputes which arise in
the course of such bargaining.
Some commentators have displayed confusion as to the signifi-
cance of statutory criteria. It has been suggested that statutory
directions to interest arbitrators to consider the public employer's
ability to pay are ineffective because the ability to pay standard
usually is not placed at the top of the list of criteria. 20 Of course,
no importance should be attached to the physical order of a list
unless the statute indicates that the criteria at the beginning are
more important than those at the end.
Critics have also asserted that arbitrators are more concerned
about the needs of the employees whose wage increase claims are
under consideration than the ability of the citizenry to bear the
burden of these increases. Wherever this assertion appears, how-
ever, it does not seem to be supported by citation to specific exam-
ples."7 ' Analysis of interest arbitrations, court decisions, and the
published research leads the authors to the opposite conclusion. The
many cases examined reveal a great concern with current govern-
mental fiscal difficulties and an acknowledgment by the arbitrators
that public services must be maintained or increased at the lowest
possible cost. Only two arbitration awards under section 209(4) have
been annulled in court: one was set aside because of fraud and
misconduct on the part of the employer representative; 272 the other
was vacated by the appellate division because the court found that
the award lacked a rational basis since the city did not have the
ability to finance the award2 3 As for the awards issued under the
New York City binding impasse procedures, all but one were af-
firmed by the tripartite Board of Collective Bargaining in unani-
mous decisions. The one award which required modification in-
volved reduction by a small fraction of the wage award in order to
270 Zagoria, Compulsory, Binding Arbitration Likely to be Pushed in 1977, 7 L.M.R.S.
Newsletter 3 (Dec. 1976).
" See, e.g., id.
22 Bethlehem Steel Corp. v. Fennie, 86 Misc. 2d 968, 383 N.Y.S.2d 948 (Sup. Ct. Erie
County 1976), discussed in notes 134-41 and accompanying text supra.
21 City of Buffalo v. Rinaldo, 56 App. Div. 2d 212, 392 N.Y.S.2d 146 (4th Dep't 1977),
appeal filed, (Ct. App. Feb. 28, 1977), discussed in notes 87-93 and accompanying text supra.
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meet the wage guidelines of the Emergency Financial Control
Board. 274
On a purely economic basis, the statistics show that interest
arbitration awards issued under the Taylor Law provided lower av-
erage wage benefits than did voluntary negotiations in the same
period. 275 Thus, there is no apparent factual support for the criticism
that interest arbitrators will be overly generous with the public fisc.
Certainly, an occasional case such as the Buffalo controversy may
arise, 2 but even this award has been subjected to strenuous judicial
review.
Some opponents of interest arbitration have argued that it has
a chilling effect on negotiations. Their rationale is that the availa-
bility of a final step will discourage hard bargaining and compro-
mise by negotiators who know that the dispute can ultimately be
settled by a neutral. There is no evidence to the effect that compul-
sory arbitration has had a chilling effect on the bargaining process.
Indeed, the statistics for New York City indicate a relatively light
utilization of binding arbitration compared to a large total of negoti-
ated settlements.277 Moreover, the Cornell report found that factors
other than the availability of arbitration under the Taylor Law were
most important in determining whether impasse procedures would
be necessary to achieve finality.278 Further, the evidence from em-
ployee groups subject to Taylor Law impasse procedures other than
interest arbitration does not support the conclusion that these
groups have a greater tendency toward contract settlement by nego-
tiations than do the police and firefighters under interest arbitra-
tion.2 9 For example, two recent sets of negotiations between the
State of New York and the Civil Service Employees Association for
the major units of state employees have required the use of impasse
procedures. Under the 1973-1976 contracts, salary negotiations took
place subject to a reopener clause. These negotiations were resolved
by legislative action pursuant to section 209(4)(d) after settlement
efforts had failed.28 1 In an attempt to reach agreement under the
successor contracts to those mentioned above, a factfinding panel
21 See notes 197-200 and accompanying text supra.
"I Public Employment Relations News No. 9, at 1, 6 (Oct. 1976).
211 See notes 87-93 and accompanying text supra.
21, See notes 193-94 and accompanying text supra.
21 See text accompanying note 117 supra.
71 See notes 106-08 and accompanying text supra.
211 Letter from Leonard R. Kershaw, Assistant Director of Executive Department, New
York Office of Employee Relations, to Eleanor MacDonald (Feb. 18, 1977).
[Vol. 51:453
COMPULSORY INTEREST ARBITRATION
was convened. After the Governor rejected the factfinder's recom-
mendations, the dispute was referred to the Legislature. Prior to
legislative action, however, agreement was finally reached on the
eve of the union strike deadline.2"'
The Cornell report concluded that the collective bargaining
process has not been effectively utilized in New York 2 2 and that the
parties to police and firefighter negotiations have indicated a lack
of any real movement by either side during bargaining. s3 It has been
suggested that collective bargaining cannot be effective unless some
"threat" is present to induce labor and management negotiators to
agree on a contract.214 In the private sector, the threat is very real
since strikes and lockouts have severe economic consequences for
unions and employers. In the public sector, it may be that the
prospect of a decision by a third party will prove to be the incentive
for voluntary agreement. Certainly, the high rate of unanimous de-
cisions under section 209(4)(d) 215 would seem to indicate that agree-
ment has been reached prior to issuance of the public arbitration
panel award. Similarly, the low rate of appeals from interest arbi-
tration awards under the NYCCBL and the unanimous Board deci-
sions on those appeals2s' indicate labor and management satisfac-
tion with the awards. The authors do not believe that the sole reason
for any paucity of serious negotiations in the public sector is the
structure of the Taylor Law. It appears that the general inexperi-
ence of local government authorities and police and firefighter un-
ions with the bargaining process has been a more significant obsta-
cle to real negotiations than the current finality procedures. The
employers are generally loath to surrender their traditional preroga-
tive of determining conditions of employment and some are not yet
strongly committed to public employee collective bargaining. Pub-
lic employer-employee contract negotiations are in part a political
process wherein the employer shares power with employee repre-
sentatives, and government officials are understandably reluctant
to share political power with any group. What is required in New
York State is an increased commitment by government employers
to the bargaining process. Such a commitment, of course, will de-
2' N.Y. Times, Apr. 18, 1977, at 54, col. 6.
See KocHAN, supra note 58, at 323.
2 Id. at 119.
254 See, e.g., id. at 125; Kagel & Kagel, Using Two New Arbitration Techniques,
MONTHLY LAB. REV., Nov. 1972, at 11-12.
2 See note 95 and accompanying text supra.
2" See notes 197-200 and accompanying text supra.
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velop only over time. As experience with the bargaining process
increases, it may be hoped that there will be more movement and
true negotiation and less reliance on intervention by third-party
neutrals. Similarly, as public employee unions gain experience with
the techniques of bargaining, they will be better able to persuade
employers to negotiate and they may learn to avoid actions that will
stiffen the opposition into an intransigent position.117
The great majority of contracts subject to the NYCCBL are
settled by agreement rather than by interest arbitration. Awards
were issued in only 7.8% of the 411 contracts open since the 1972
enactment of binding arbitration. ' In the authors' view, the low
rate of utilization of compulsory arbitration in New York City re-
sults from the historically strong commitment to bargaining on the
part of both the municipal administration and the local public em-
ployee unions. Experienced negotiators prefer, if possible, to settle
their own disputes without third-party intervention. Since the
NYCCBL provides that the parties shall share the cost of impasse
procedures,' 9 there is an economic sanction militating against the
use of the impasse procedures.
For any improvement to take place, public employers must
recognize that public employee bargaining is here to stay. Each side
of the table must have a commitment to the bargaining process and
a sincere desire to reach voluntary accommodation. Until this atti-
tudinal change occurs, there will undoubtedly be a very heavy reli-
ance on such outside intervention as factfinding and arbitration.
The repeated use of compulsory arbitration, however, should not be
viewed as harmful in these circumstances.2 19 Nor is it logical to
assume that if the arbitration provisions of section 209(4) are re-
pealed, parties will negotiate any more effectively than they do now.
217 See KOCHAN, supra note 58, at 4-6.
2M See note 194 and accompanying text supra.
NEW YORK, N.Y. ADMIN. CODE ch. 54, § 1174(b) (1976).
"I Other commentators have expressed the view that the lack of commitment to and
expertise in public sector labor relations is responsible for the number of disputes that require
third-party intervention. See authorities cited in Veglahn, Education by Third Party Neu-
trals: Functions, Methods, and Extent, 28 LAB. L.J. 20, 21 nn.1-4 (1977). A recent study of
public sector collective bargaining in northern New York State concluded that inexperience
and naivete were characteristics on both sides of the table. The author found that there was
a lack of commitment to the negotiating process on the part of management and a lack of
mutual trust by both management and labor. Id. at 24. The parties generally believed that
neutrals could help them by fulfilling certain educational functions; these were development
of mutual trust, pointing out the advisability of negotiating in private, developing among
inexperienced bargainers the ability to define the issues, and encouraging the sharing of
information. Id. at 25-26.
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If there is a return to the legislative hearing process, it is conceivable
that public employers, realizing that they have little to lose by a
failure to make significant movement during negotiations, will in-
clude legislative action as a part of their negotiating strategy. The
police and firefighter unions have already warned that they will not
quietly return to a situation wherein the employer has the ultimate
voice in setting terms and conditions of employment. 9 ' The Cornell
researchers expressed the following ominous speculation:
[T]here is some indirect evidence to suggest that serious pressures
were building up within some of the largest bargaining relation-
ships during the last years under the [former impasse procedure].
The fact that no serious work stoppages occurred throughout the
difficult economic period that the arbitration statute has been in
effect might be interpreted as an indication of the strength of
arbitration as a strike deterrent. A return to [the legislative hear-
ing] in the present economic and political climate would therefore
possibly result in eruption of the pressures that appeared to be
mounting in previous years. We should caution, however, that this
judgment is based more on our general impressions obtained from
interviews than on any hard quantitative evidence." '292
It seems clear that for any system of wage and benefit determi-
nation to prevent strikes, it must be perceived as essentially fair and
just. Professor Morris, in discussing the high rate of strikes under
the Australian system of compulsory arbitration, has observed that
"the law could not contain workers and unions who felt that they
were not getting their fair share from the award process. 293 Any
action taken by the legislature to extend or modify the provisions
of section 209(4) must be based on a realization that unless the
police officers and firefighters of the State of New York believe that
the impasse resolution provisions of the Taylor Law are equitable,
these provisions are not likely to prevent interruptions of essential
services.
There have been no strikes by police or firefighters subject to
compulsory binding interest arbitration under the Taylor Law. 294
Since the amendment of the compulsory arbitration provisions of
ni See note 265 and accompanying text supra.
' KocHAN, supra note 58, at 330.
,,1 Morris, The Role of Interest Arbitration in a Collective Bargaining System, in FuTuRE
OF LABOR ARBrrRAiON iN AMERICA 197, 223 (1976).
"' New York State Public Employment Relations Board, Statement Concerning Binding
Arbitration for Officers or Members of any Organized Fire Dep't or Police Force of any
County, Town, Village, or Fire District (Except City of New York) 11 (1977).
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the NYCCBL, there has been only one illegal strike among employ-
ees subject to its jurisdiction over a contract dispute. This was a 5
1/2 hour walkout by firefighters in 1973.295 There have been a few
other strikes by city employees, including two in response to fiscally
mandated layoffs arising out of the city's financial crisis, but these
were not related to negotiations over the terms of a new contract. 9
A frequently heard objection to interest arbitration in the pub-
lic sector is that it removes from elected officials the ultimate power
to fix wages and other terms and conditions of employment and thus
constitutes a "threat to the ability of elected officials to continue to
set public policy priorities for use of public funds . *.".."297 Some of
these opponents of interest arbitration have urged a return to legis-
lative action since, in their view, public sector collective bargaining
is a political process which must have a political rather than an
administrative or judicial resolution. ' Although the superficial
symmetry of this argument may seem appealing, closer examination
discloses that the theory is faulty. First, it is a false assumption that
public sector bargaining is entirely a political process. The will of
the electorate and the individual political aspirations of the various
negotiators are tempered by the play of economic forces and the
requirements of public safety. Second, while collective bargaining
negotiations between a government and its employees are in part a
political process which very often finds a political solution, those
negotiations which result in impasse have obviously failed to find a
purely political resolution. These impasses must be resolved in a
manner that will produce labor peace and create a general belief
that some sort of justice and equity have been accomplished. The
purely political solution proposed by local government employ-
ers-a return to legislative action-will not be perceived as equita-
ble by public employees because they will view it as affording the
employer the final word. There is certainly little incentive to partici-
pate in fruitful negotiations when the employer is aware that its
persistence will enable it to obtain a determination of the terms and
conditions of employment from a body over which it exercises con-
siderable influence. Thus, a return to legislative action may itself
25 [1973] OCB ANN. REP. 9.
"1 [1975] OCB ANN. REP. 24.
2" Zagoria, Compulsory, Binding Arbitration Likely to be Pushed in 1977, L.M.R.S.
Newsletter 3 (Dec. 1976).
"s See Symposium on Police and Firefighter Arbitration in New York State 2.29 (Dec.
3, 1976) (unpublished transcript of proceedings sponsored by New York State Public Employ-
ment Relations Board) (remarks of Mr. Wollett).
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exert a chilling effect on public employee negotiations.
It is submitted that the tripartite public arbitration panel es-
tablished by section 209(4), combined with the current judicial re-
view procedures, provide a reasonable method of resolving impasses.
The panel is a part of the political process in that both labor and
management name a representative to the panel and both sides
jointly select the neutral chairman. The deliberations of the panel
are an extension of the negotiating process. But the decision of the
panel is not purely political, for the panel's award must adhere to
the statutory standards, and be within the lawful scope of bargain-
ing and is subject to judicial review. The existence of judicial review
does not mean that it will always be utilized, nor that the judges
will find themselves compelled to decide terms and conditions of
employment for public employees. If past experience is taken as a
guide, the majority of arbitration awards will be confirmed by the
courts, and any awards that are found to be contrary to law will be
sent back for a further arbitration proceeding.
Some of the management spokesmen who oppose interest arbi-
tration argue that "some arbitrators, coming largely from the pri-
vate sector, are inadequately prepared to understand the realistic
limitations on a city's ability to raise taxes or the ripple effects of a
change in pay or benefits" and that, in any case, the "outside pro-
fessional" should not be given the power to make far reaching and
complex public policy decisions. 99 One answer to this argument is
that the parties should select only experienced arbitrators who have
shown an ability to rule intelligently in complex cases. Since arbi-
tration decisions are widely reported in a variety of services, there
is sufficient available information to guide a party in its choice of
an arbitrator."'0
The second answer to the criticism concerning the accountabil-
ity of arbitrators requires an examination of the assumptions under-
lying the criticism. Is it true that legislators and local government
officials will usually be more concerned with fiscal integrity and the
public interest than an arbitrator will be? There have been many
instances where elected officials have reached generous settlements
that have been criticized as being fiscally disastrous."' Further, it
- Zagoria, Compulsory, Binding Arbitration Likely to be Pushed in 1977, L.M.R.S.
Newsletter 3 (Dec. 1976).
30 Arbitration awards are reported by, among others, the American Arbitration Associa-
tion and in the Government Employee Relations Report (BNA).
311 For example, San Francisco Mayor Alioto's approval of a substantial wage increase
for police officers was opposed by that city's board of supervisors for financial reasons. See
Gov'T EMPL. REL. REP. (BNA) No. 546, at B-10 (Mar. 18, 1974).
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is not unknown for legislative bodies reacting to union pressure to
vote benefits for public employees which are unequalled in the pri-
vate sector and thereby produce what may be charitably character-
ized as anomalous situations. For example, the "Heart Bill," 302 re-
newed regularly by the New York State Legislature,3 establishes a
presumption that any heart ailment occurring during paid employ-
ment in a police or fire department arose as a result of such employ-
ment. Consequently, disability pensions have been awarded to some
former public employees who do not seem disabled. These include
"police surgeons" who typically worked 24 hours per week for the
police department and are now collecting disability pensions of over
$20,000 per year while admittedly attending to their busy private
practices.3 4 The experience with the "Stavisky-Goodman" legisla-
tion 5 similarly illustrates that when a powerful union is frustrated
at the bargaining table it may resort to direct legislative action.
The point of this discussion is not to castigate either public
employers or public employees, but to introduce some balance into
a discussion which is usually characterized by statements such as:
"if you're ready to let an arbitrator levy a first mortgage on your
City Hall or County Building, you're ready for compulsory arbitra-
tion. ' 30 All the evidence to date indicates that to the extent city hall
is mortgaged by decisions affecting employment relations, that
mortgage actually has been necessitated by management or legisla-
tive actions and not by decisions rendered by interest arbitrators.
It should be recognized that there are competent, public-spirited
arbitrators who are well able to analyze arguments relating to bud-
getary matters and fiscal priorities.
While compulsory arbitration is useful as a pressure valve
where a strike by public employees is forbidden, it should not take
the place of collective bargaining, but rather should be used as a
supplement or aid. Although a tripartite arbitration panel can serve
as an extension of the negotiating process, it does involve third-
party intrusion, and thus its use should continue to be the exception
10 N.Y. GEN. MuN. LAW § 207-k (McKinney Supp. 1977).
10 See N.Y. RETRE. & SOC. SEC. LAW § 480 (McKinney Supp. 1977).
1" See N.Y. Times, Feb. 9, 1977 at 1, Col. 2.
3- Ch. 132, [1976] N.Y. Laws 342 (McKinney), amending N.Y. EDUc. LAW § 2576(5)
(McKinney Supp. 1977). This legislation was reviewed and upheld in Board of Educ. v. City
of New York, No. 101 (Ct. App. April 5, 1977), rev'g 54 App. Div. 2d 630, 387 N.Y.S.2d 614
(1st Dep't 1976), aff'g 88 Misc. 2d 179, 387 N.Y.S.2d 195 (N.Y. County 1976).
3 Zagoria, -Compulsory, Binding Arbitration Likely to be Pushed in 1977, L.M.R.S.
Newsletter 3, 4 (Dec. 1976).
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rather than the rule. Voluntary agreement is preferable, and the
parties should work toward that goal. Clearly, training and experi-
ence in methods of preparing for and conducting negotiations will
help promote the goal of fair and reasonable public employment
contracts. The New York experience with interest arbitration and
the court decisions upholding it show that interest arbitration does
work in cases where the strike is banned, and that it is a far prefera-
ble alternative to unilateral action by the employer or an illegal
strike by employees.
Authors' Note: As this Article went to print, the New York Court of Appeals unani-
mously reversed the appellate division in City of Buffalo v. Rinaldo, No. 414 (N.Y. Ct. App.
June 6, 1977), rev'g 56 App. Div. 2d 212, 392 N.Y.S.2d 46 (4th Dep't 1977), discussed in notes
87-93 and accompanying text supra, and reinstated the award of the arbitrators. In so ruling,
the court reaffirmed the principle enunciated in Caso v. Coffey, 41 N.Y.2d 153, 158, 359
N.E.2d 683, 686, 391 N.Y.S.2d 88, 91 (1976), discussed in notes 78-86 and accompanying text
supra, that judicial review of arbitration awards is limited to a determination of whether the
award is rational or arbitrary and capricious. Finding that the arbitration panel had consid-
ered numerous factors in formulating its award, including testimony regarding the City's final
problems and "identified, nonspeculative sources of additional revenue," No. 414, slip op. at
4, the Rinaldo Court held that the award was not irrational. The Court of Appeals stated that
"it must be recognized that the statute, the wisdom of which is for others to decide, vests
broad authority in the arbitration panel to determine municipal fiscal priorities within exist-
ing revenues." Id. Thus, the court concluded, "the Appellate Division should not have drawn
its own conclusions from the weight of the evidence or substituted its judgment for that of
the arbitrators." Id. at 5.
On June 7, 1977, Governor Carey signed a bill extending New York State's local police
and fire arbitration statute for another 2 years. Ch. 216, § 1, [1977] N.Y. Laws. The legisla-
tion made various changes in § 209 of the Taylor Law, N.Y. Civ. SERv. LAW § 209 (McKinney
Supp. 1976). The most significant changes are the elimination of the factfinding step prior
to arbitration, the addition of a requirement that the parties share the cost of the neutral
member of the panel as well as the cost of any transcript made, and the addition of a
requirement that the panel consider certain enumerated criteria and "specify the basis for
its findings." Ch. 216, § 1, [1977] N.Y. Laws.
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